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THE "RIGHT" TO A DISINTERESTED
PROSECUTOR OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT: UNPACKING
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERESTS
JOAN MEIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the least regulated areas'of judicial power is the authority to
hold individuals in contempt of court. 1 This power, inherited from Eng-
lish common law, has been decried as a relic of the "divine law of kings"2
that gives judges "unbridled discretion"3 to punish individuals for dis-
obeying their orders. Indeed, at common law courts could hold individu-
als in contempt summarily, Le., without a trial, whenever a judge
believed his order had been violated.4 In recognition of the potential for
arbitrary abuses of the contempt power, 5 the Supreme Court has ac-
corded the accused numerous rights of due process in prosecutions for
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington University National Law Center.
Thanks go to Frank Easterbrook, Judith Areen, Bryan Camp, Naomi Cahn, and Tony Gamrbino,
for their thoughtful comments and encouragement at various stages of this project.
1. Contempt of court is the intentional violation of a court order, or misbehavior in the pres-
ence of the judge. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 203-04 & nn.2, 5 & 6 (1968). The contempt
power traditionally has been termed an "inherent" power of the court. Id. at 198 n.2 (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 286-87 (1783) ("laws with-
out a competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempt would be
vain and nugatory. A power, therefore... to supress such contempts by an immediate attachment
of the offender results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and must be an inseparable
attendant upon every superior tribunal.")). In addition, numerous court rules and some state and
federal statutes authorize contempt sanctions of a certain length and type for specific infractions.
See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 206-07 n.8; Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 21st Cong., 2d sess., 4 Stat. 487; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 402, 3692 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1995, 2000h (1988).
2. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 11 (1963), cited in David J. Harmer,
Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 239, 246 n.50
(1990).
3. Harmer, supra note 2, at 249.
4. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 194, 196 n.1, 198 n.2 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 286-87).
5. Id. at 202 n.4 ("That contempt power ... is capable of abuse is certain. Men who make
their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility [sic], narrowness, arrogance, and other
weaknesses to which human flesh is heir.") (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)).
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criminal contempt.6 Over the past century, the Court has held that al-
leged criminal contemnors are entitled to the presumption of innocence,
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the privilege against self-
incrimination;7 notice of the charges, an opportunity to respond and call
witnesses, and the assistance of counsel;8 a public trial before an unbiased
judge;9 and a jury trial for nonpetty contempts.10
The Court adopted these rights for accused criminal contemnors based
on an analogy to the rights of criminal defendants. Noting that criminal
contempt "is a violation of the law, a public wrong that is punishable by
fine or imprisonment or both," and that "convictions for criminal con-
tempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their
impact on the criminal defendant is the same,"11 the Court has held that
accused criminal contenors' interests are essentially the same as those
of criminal defendants and that the same due process rights are necessary
to achieve fundamental fairness12 in both realms.13
6. The characterization of a contempt proceeding as "civil" or "criminal" depends on the
purpose of the sanctions sought. A contempt proceeding is "civil" if it is brought to coerce compli-
ance with the underlying order, and the contemnor can avoid the penalty by complying, i.e., he has
"the keys of the prison in his own pockets." Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988) (quoting
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947)). See also In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir.
1902). In the paradigmatic civil contempt proceeding, a grand jury witness who refuses to testify is
sent to jail until he or she agrees to testify. See, eg., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
In contrast, an action is for "criminal contempt" if the contemnor is given a fixed sentence as pun-
ishment for past violations of a court order. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632. The distinction between civil
and criminal contempt is, however, far more difficult than this simple definition suggests. See infra
Section IV, notes 150-189 and accompanying text.
7. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
8. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
9. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
10. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). Petty cases are those resulting in sentences of
six months or fewer. Id. at 197. In Bloom the Supreme Court held that "petty" criminal contempts
punishable by fewer than six months did not require a right to a jury trial, consistent with the well-
established rule that "petty" crimes punishable by fewer than six months do not entitle the defendant
to a right to trial by jury. Id. at 197-98. However, the Supreme Court since has cast doubt on the
"serious/petty" distinction, implying that defendants in "petty" contempt prosecutions are entitled
to many of the same procedural protections as those in "serious" ones. Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 809 n.20 (1987).
11. Bloom, 381 U.S. at 201.
12. Id. at 201-02. In the criminal context, due process requires the adoption of those proce-
dures and rights deemed "fundamental" to ensure a fair proceeding. Id. at 201; Andrew Sidman,
Note, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AMER. U. L. REV. 754, 788 (1976).
13. Two types of contempt proceedings are excepted from the criminal analogy: summary con-
tempt proceedings for in-court contempts and civil contempt proceedings. Summary proceedings,
Le., those without a full trial-type hearing, are still permitted for in-court contempts that interfere
with the judicial process, such as the refusal to answer a question when ordered or the refusal of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/4
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In its most recent decision concerning the rights of accused criminal
contemnors, Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. ,1 the
Supreme Court has purported to follow these precedents by adopting an
additional right for criminal contemnors based on the due process rights
of criminal defendants. The right to a "disinterested prosecutor"
adopted in Young prohibits a successful litigant in a civil action from
prosecuting the opposing party for criminal contempt for violation of an
injunction won in the underlying civil proceeding. Under Young only a
State prosecutor or "disinterested" private counsel appointed to act for
the State may bring such criminal contempt actions.
Interestingly, however, the plurality declined to hold that a disinter-
ested prosecutor was constitutionally required, ruling instead under its
supervisory authority over the federal courts.15 For this reason, Young
technically does not apply to state courts. Nonetheless, the opinion has
significant implications for states' contempt proceedings. Indeed, several
state courts have already applied Young to their own procedures and
counsel to cease a particular line of questioning. See Young, 481 U.S. at 798; Bloom, 391 U.S. at
204. In such cases, the judge already has seen the defendant's conduct and the only issues involved
in the summary proceeding are the seriousness of the conduct and the appropriate sanction. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) (Judge must certify that she saw or heard conduct before imposing summary
punishment for in-court contempt).
In addition, civil contempt proceedings, those in which the contemnor is capable of avoiding the
sentence by complying with the order, also do not give rise to comparable rights of due process.
However, because civil contemnors can be jailed indefinitely, until they express a willingness to
comply with the order, the sanctions imposed in a "civil" contempt action often can be far more
severe than those imposed in criminal contempt proceedings. The case of Elizabeth Morgan has
brought this issue to public attention. Claiming that her former husband had sexually abused their
daughter, she refused to comply with a court order to turn the daughter over to the former husband
for unsupervised visitation. She spent over two years in jail for violation of the order. The Morgan
case resulted in Congress' adopting legislation amending the District of Columbia Code to limit the
length of time that civil contemnors can serve in custody cases. District of Columbia Civil Contempt
Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633. See also Harmer, supra
note 2, at 256-77 (describing Morgan case and drafting of legislation to address it). The legislation
had an 18-month lifespan; Congress was to make recommendations regarding its extension and civil
contempt in general. However, the law has been codified in the D.C. Code without any time limita-
tion. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-944(b) (1991 Supp.). Harmer, supra note 2, at 285-87. At least two
other states, Wisconsin and California, also have adopted caps (of 6 and 12 months, respectively) on
civil incarceration for contempt. See NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1988, at 1.
This Article does not directly address civil contempt. However, the ambiguity of the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt, see discussion infra Section IV, notes 145-85 and accompany-
ing text, is central to the Article's argument that all contempts have both "civil" and "criminal"
aspects, and that therefore not all due process rights of criminal defendants are in fact appropriate
for "criminal" contemnors.
14. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
15. Id. at 809 & n.21.
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found them wanting. Some courts appear to have erroneously assumed
they were bound by the decision.16 Others, while recognizing the non-
binding nature of Young, have nonetheless been troubled by the decision
and have suggested that the issue should be addressed under the highest
state court's supervisory power.1 7  These responses are understandable.
Although only Justice Blackmun argued that the right to a disinterested
prosecutor should be constitutional," the plurality opinion reads, in both
tone and reasoning, like a due process holding that ought to apply across
the board.19 Perhaps more important, the Court has in the past used its
16. Department of Social Servs. v. Montero, 758 P.2d 690 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (Young re-
quires reversal of contempt conviction prosecuted by same government department that brought
underlying child support action); Carter v. Brodrick, 750 P.2d 843, 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)
(dicta suggesting that Young may require reversal of contempt prosecution by interested party's
attorney in child custody case). But cf Rollins v. State, 748 P.2d 767, 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)
(Young does not invalidate government's contempt prosecution when government also brought the
underlying civil action, in part because Young relied upon only supervisory authority).
17. State ex rel O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (if disinter-
ested prosecutor issue were necessary to decide the case, case would have to be transferred to Mis-
souri Supreme Court for decision under its supervisory authority). See also Commonwealth v.
Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1989) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (Kentucky Supreme Court
should prohibit interested prosecutors in ordinary criminal cases under its own supervisory author-
ity, consistent with Young).
Over time more courts have declined to apply Young to state-court proceedings because it was not
a constitutional decision. See, eg., Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 198 (6th Cir. 1989) (Celebrezze,
J., concurring) (Young does not govern contempt proceeding in state court because only supervisory
authority); Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); In re
Marriage of Betts, 558 N.E.2d 404,426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (same), app. denied, 567 N.E.2d 378 (Ill.
1991); Scott v. United States, 536 A.2d, 1040, 1047 n.8 (D.C. 1987) (Young does not apply to Dis-
trict of Columbia court because only supervisory authority); Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d at 883 (because
Young is not a due process decision it does not prohibit use of private prosecutor in homicide trial).
18. 481 U.S. at 814-15.
19. The absolute tone of Young's discussion of the right to a disinterested prosecutor is rein-
forced by the plurality's holding that an interested prosecutor so fundamentally taints a proceeding
that the harmless error doctrine cannot apply. Id. at 809-14. In fact, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 728 n.2 (1988), the Court referred to Young as "determining the constitutionally
permissible authority of courts."
Although supervisory rulings are theoretically case specific and subject to flexible application, 481
U.S. at 809 n.21, United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1475 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom.
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), the Young holding has been treated as
binding by federal courts in a variety of factual contexts. See In re Davidson, 908 F.2d 1249 (5th
Cir. 1990) (corporate attorney may not prosecute opposing corporate party for criminal contempt);
United States ex reL SEC v. Carter, 907 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1990) (SEC attorneys who brought
underlying proceeding may not prosecute criminal contempt); In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1506-
09 (5th Cir. 1990) (trustee in bankruptcy may not prosecute criminal contempt proceeding); Yanks
v. United States, 882 F.2d 497 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (same). See also Scott v. United States, 536 A.2d
1040, 1053 (D.C. 1987) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (Young holding not limited to its facts, and applies to
conflict-of-interest challenge to a judge in District of Columbia court), aff'd on reh'g, 559 A.2d 745
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/4
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supervisory authority to test potential new due process rights, which it
has subsequently given constitutional status.20 In short, further in-depth
analysis is needed both to inform any future consideration of the issue by
the Supreme Court and to assist state courts that are formulating their
own policies in the wake of Young.
The issue also demands careful examination because adoption of a
right to a disinterested prosecutor could be devastating for many small-
scale private litigants in state court proceedings. Litigants in domestic
relations, landlord-tenant, and other small commercial cases often obtain
court orders establishing their rights, and then bring enforcement actions
for contempt to vindicate the rights those orders established. Private liti-
gants typically bring such state court contempt actions by motion, with-
out special court appointment or referral to a state prosecutor's office. 2 '
State statutes or rules limit the sentences in these actions to fines of sev-
eral hundred dollars or jail sentences of six months or fewer.22 If a "dis-
interested prosecutor" is required in such cases, enforcement actions will
have to be prosecuted by the State or appointed "disinterested" counsel,
or not at all. However, these are not the kinds of cases state prosecutors
are accustomed to bringing. State District Attorneys, who lack sufficient
time to cope with even their normal criminal caseload, undoubtedly will
consider prosecutions of contempts of privately obtained civil orders too
(D.C. 1989). This Article only addresses Young's applicability to problematic state courts, as ex-
plained infra in note 27.
20. For example, in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 17 (1975), the Supreme Court exercised its
supervisory power to reverse a conviction based on defendant's silence after being given Miranda
warnings; in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court adopted the right to remain silent as a
due process right. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that certain mini-
mum due process protections apply to juveniles tried under the Juvenile Court Act, without explic-
itly adopting them as due process rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process clause applies
to juvenile delinquency hearings). This pattern has been fairly common in the Court's past adoption
of new tights for criminal contemnors. See Cheffv. Shnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1965) (establishing
right to jury trial for nonpetty contempts under supervisory authority); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968) (adopting right to jury trial as due process right); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954) (reversing criminal contempt conviction on grounds of judicial bias pursuant to supervisory
authority); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (holding that criminal contempt trial before per-
sonally affronted judge violates due process). The state courts are aware of this trend. See Peterson
v. Peterson, 153 N.W.2d 825, 828 n.3 (Minn. 1967) (noting that Cheff supervisory decision is likely
to be extended to constitutional rule and applied to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
21. Mo. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-202 (1989); 2 Mo. RULES, Rule P4(a) (1991)
("any person having actual knowledge of the alleged contempt" may institute contempt proceeding).
22. See, eg., D.C. IntraFamily Rules 7(c), 12(c) ($300 or six months); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 751
(McKinney 1991) ($I,000 or 30 days); D.C. IntraFamily Rule 7(c); IND. CODE § 34-4-7-6 (1986)
(S500 or three months), repealed by P.L. 308-1987, § 7 (1990-91 Supp).
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minor and of insufficient public import to prosecute.23 Nor, for the same
reasons, can we expect that such cases will attract pro bono counsel.
Without enforcement of civil orders by the "interested private parties,"
such orders will be virtually unenforceable and will become largely
ineffective.
The Young Court asserted that lack of prosecutor time is an insuffi-
cient reason to permit appointment of the opposing party's private coun-
sel. The Court relied in part on the Solicitor General's representation
that the statutes appropriating funds for the operation of the federal
courts would "permit reimbursement" of attorneys appointed as special
prosecutors.24 Appointment of such "special prosecutors," however, is
not a realistic solution, particularly in state courts.25 Even in federal
court, there is no well-established fund to compensate appointed counsel
for contempt cases, and courts have been unwilling to make such ap-
pointments without more specific statutory or judicial authorization. 26
In this Article I argue that, contrary to Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion and the opinions of several state courts, courts should not ex-
pand Young to establish a new due process right for criminal contemnors
23. State ex rel O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (county and
circuit prosecutors could not meet demand for contempt prosecutors in petty cases, bulk of which
are domestic relations) (dicta). In fact, the District of Columbia IntraFamily Offenses Act was
amended to create a private right of action in civil protection order and and enforcement proceed-
ings because the corporation counsel, the government agency assigned the role of representing peti-
tioners under the Act, was unable to handle all of the cases. Castellanos v. Castellanos, 117 Daily
Wash. Law. Rptr. 1192, 1194 (D.C. 1989).
24. 481 U.S. at 806 n.17.
25. O'Brien, 778 S.W.2d at 407. The Missouri Court of Appeals noted that "the question arises
as to where do the funds come from to pay the appointed attorney to prosecute when that attorney
must be 'disinterested.' The Young court disposed of this question in a footnote.... No such funds
are appropriated to State courts. If one of the parties is indigent the assessment of attorney fees
against that individual would be meaningless."
26. In Musidor, B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 944 (1982), the Second Circuit rejected the right to a disinterested prosecutor for this reason,
among others:
The practicalities of the situation-when the criminal contempt occurs outside the pres-
ence of the court but in civil litigation-require that the court be permitted to appoint
counsel for the bpposing party to prosecute the contempt. There is no fund out of which to
pay other counsel in such an event, nor would it be proper that he be paid by the opposing
party. This is not the kind of case for which legal aid societies or public defenders are
available.
Id. at 65. The Second Circuit's view appears to be confirmed by the experiences of some counsel
who have found federal courts unwilling, because of a lack of a funding mechanism, to appoint a
private, disinterested contempt prosecutor, despite the Young footnote. Conversation with Robert
Jacobs, one of the counsel in the Young case.
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that would bind state courts.27 Neither logic nor principle supports ele-
vation of the "right" adopted in Young to the level of a due process right.
Although the Young decision purports to follow the precedents establish-
ing due process rights for criminal contemnors, it actually contradicts the
spirit of those cases: unlike other due process rights, the right to a "dis-
interested prosecutor" representing the State does not buffer accused
contemnors from State power. Rather, at least in theory, it increases the
power the State brings to bear against such individuals, who otherwise
would face only private-party prosecution. In addition because this re-
quirement does not actually protect individual defendants from State
power, but rather stems from a commitment to keeping our criminal jus-
tice system one of public justice and accountability, it is not appropriate
in the contempt context, in which private enforcement is a key value.
In Section II of the Article, I review the Young decision, highlighting
and clarifying the unstated assumptions on which it rests. In Section III,
I examine the first of these underlying assumptions, that due process re-
quires a "disinterested prosecutor," questioning its validity both as a
matter of historical practice and as a matter of principle. In Section IV, I
analyze the second underlying assumption, that a due process require-
ment in the criminal context necessarily applies to criminal contempt. I
discuss the limits of the "criminal analogy" on which the Young holding
is based, and I suggest that the legal distinction between civil and crimi-
nal contempt is more a fiction than a reality. Further, even most "crimi-
nal" contempt litigation is no different from any other private action
because, unlike the Young prosecutors, plaintiffs in contempt litigation
do not normally assume the full prosecutorial powers of the State.
Finally, I conclude that even if there is a due process right to a disin-
terested prosecutor in criminal prosecutions, the analogy between crimi-
nal prosecutions and criminal contempt does not hold in this instance.
The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor in criminal cases is based
27. Although similar arguments can be made against application of the right in federal courts,
(and it may prove equally difficult to implement there, see supra note 25) this Article focuses on
Young's applicability to state courts because: (1) Young has largely settled the question for the
federal courts; and (2) the problem with the Young decision is clearest in the context of state-court
proceedings, which are generally smaller and less likely to entail significant resources being brought
to bear against an accused. O'Brien, 778 S.W.2d at 498 (Grimm, P.J., concurring) (whereas "[in
Young, the attorneys were granted broad discretion to investigate and prosecute persons who might
be violating the injunction[, i]n contrast, in most state cases [such as child custody and visitation
disputes], an attorney would be appointed for a limited purpose of prosecuting a specific existing
violation.").
1992]
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on a particular view of the role of the "public prosecutor." This role,
perhaps appropriate in criminal prosecutions that seek to uphold the
criminal law and effect public justice, has less place in contempt prosecu-
tions brought by private litigants to vindicate private rights. As long as
the private litigant does not assume the powers of a public prosecutor as
in Young, contempt prosecutions to enforce orders issued in private liti-
gation should remain available to the parties whose interests are at stake.
II. THE YOUNG DECISION: WHAT IT SAYS AND WHAT IT MEANS
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. 28 began as a trade-
mark infringement action brought by Vuitton et Fils, S.A. (Vuitton), the
well-known maker of expensive handbags, against some Korean family
businesses that were manufacturing and selling inexpensive imitations of
the plaintiff's merchandise.29 The parties settled the district court case,
agreeing to an injunction prohibiting the defendants from using Vuitton's
registered trademark. The settlement also provided for payment of dam-
ages.30 Still suspicous, Vuitton subsequently undertook an undercover
investigation to verify the defendants' compliance with the injunction.
Upon discovering that their suspicions were justified, Vuitton's attorney
asked the district court to appoint him as special counsel to prosecute a
criminal contempt action for violation of the injunction.31 The court ap-
pointed the attorney and his colleagues to represent the United States in
continuing the investigation and in prosecuting the contempt. 32 Upon
being notified of the attorney's appointment, the U.S. Attorney's office
merely wished him luck.33 The attorney apparently did not need it. One
month, one hundred audio and video tapes, and numerous wiretapped
telephone calls later, the "prosecutors" had collected enough evidence of
continuing counterfeiting operations to obtain two plea bargains and sev-
eral convictions. The jail sentences ranged from six months to five
years.34
On appeal to the Second Circuit, petitioners argued, inter alia, that the
appointment of their opposing party's attorney as special prosecutor vio-
28. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
29. Id. at 790.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 791.
32. Id See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
33. Young, 481 U.S. at 792.
34. Id.
[Vol. 70:85
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/4
1992] CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROSECUTORS
lated their right to be prosecuted by an impartial prosecutor.3 5 The Sec-
ond Circuit held instead that an "interested" attorney is often the only
source of information about out-of-court contempts, noting that the dan-
ger of such an attorney using prosecution as a bargaining chip in civil
litigation is minimized by judicial supervision in such cases.3 6
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the petitioners enjoyed greater
success. There, they claimed that their contempt prosecution violated
due process in two respects. First, they argued that the district court
lacked the authority to appoint counsel to prosecute the action, and that
only the U.S. Attorney may initiate a criminal contempt prosecution.37
Second, they contended that any appointed prosecutor must be "disinter-
ested," a standard that would automatically disqualify the attorney for
the opposing party.38
The Supreme Court disagreed with the first argument,3 9 but agreed'
with the second.4 In response to petitioners' first argument, the Court
35. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1985),
rey'd, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
36. Id. at 183-84. The court followed its earlier ruling in Musidor, B.V. v. Great American
Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982), in upholding the contempt
prosecution. The court declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's divergent ruling, which prohibited an
interested civil opponent from prosecuting a criminal contempt under the court's supervisory au-
thority. 780 F.2d at 184 (rejecting ruling of Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, Inc., 760 F.2d
698 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987)). In addition to these court of appeals deci-
sions, the Fifth Circuit had reached a decision similar to the Sixth Circuit's over a decade earlier.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319-20 (5th Cir.
1969) (appointment of counsel for civil opponent to prosecute criminal contempt violates due pro-
cess). These three circuits were the only federal courts of appeals to address this issue prior to the
Supreme Court's acceptance of certiorari in Young. However, courts of appeals had addressed the
issue of a disinterested prosecutor in criminal cases. See infra note 74.
37. Young, 481 U.S. at 793.
38. Id. at 802-14.
39. Id. at 793.
40. Although the Court held that a criminal contempt prosecutor must be "disinterested," it
did not adopt petitioners' claim that this requirement was a due process right, basing its ruling
instead on its supervisory authority over the federal courts. Id. at 809 & n.21.
41. Eight Justices agreed on each of the two basic holdings. Only Justice Scalia dissented from
the holding that judges have the authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute. Id. at 815-25
(Scalia, J., concurring). Only Justice White dissented from the holding that a private contempt
prosecutor must be disinterested. Id. at 827 (White, J., dissenting). Several of the Justices con-
curred and dissented on various other issues. See id. at 825-27 (Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (private prosecution should be permitted when "harm-
less error"); id. at 814-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (the requirement of a disinterested prosecutor
should be based upon due process rather than the Court's supervisory power).
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held that a court must be able to appoint a private prosecutor of a con-
tempt action.
The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential
to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority
without complete dependence on other Branches. "[C]ourts cannot be at
the mercy of another Branch [of government] in deciding whether such pro-
ceedings should be initiated." 42
The District Court's appointment of private counsel to prosecute the ac-
tion was therefore not improper per se.4 3
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with petitioners that a court may
not appoint the attorney representing the beneficiary of the underlying
civil order to prosecute a criminal contempt of that order. The Court
reasoned that prosecution of criminal contempt is undertaken on behalf
of the United States, and not on behalf of the private beneficiary of the
court order allegedly violated: "The prosecutor is appointed solely to
pursue the public interest in vindication of the court's authority. A pri-
vate attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore cer-
tainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes
such a prosecution."'
The Court emphasized a public prosecutor's unique obligation to tem-
per his or her desire to win a case with a commitment "that justice shall
be done.., that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.",45 Although
the private party's interest in obtaining the benefits of the court order
may sometimes coincide with the "[g]overnment's interest ... in dispas-
sionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. The Court did state that a court must exercise its authority to appoint a private "prosecu-
tor" with restraint, and only in those instances in which the government fails to prosecute a referral
to the U.S. Attorney. The Court did not decide whether the District Court's failure to refer the
Young case to the U.S. Attorney's office was unlawful, however, choosing to rely on its holding that
the appointment of an "interested" prosecutor was improper. Id. at 801-02.
44. Id. at 804. The Court's analysis by its terms applies only to criminal rather than civil
contempt proceedings, and lower courts have consistently refused to apply Young to those proceed-
ings they define as civil. See, eg., Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 877 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1989) (Young does not preclude interested party's attorney from
prosecuting contempt proceeding when sanction of suspended payment of a fine to opposing party
was clearly civil and remedial); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 356-60 (7th Cir.
1988) (Young does not apply to civil discrimination action); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford En-
ters., Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 399 n.12 (5th Cir. 1987) (fine designed to compensate opposing party was
civil and remedial, not governed by Young). However, as is discussed in Section IV, infra, notes
145-85 and accompanying text, the line between criminal and civil contempts is far from clear.
45. Young, 481 U.S. at 803 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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Judiciary,"'  the two interests may also at times diverge. The Court
noted that the potential for benefit or harm to a private client should not
influence a public prosecutor's decisions whether and how to prosecute. 7
Either bringing a "tenuously supported prosecution" or "abandoning a
meritorious prosecution"" in order to obtain benefits for a private party
would obstruct the administration of "impartial" justice.4 9 Finally, the
Court emphasized that "procedures in criminal contempt cases have
come to mirror those used in ordinary criminal cases,"50 and stated that
"[tihe requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with that
trend. . .. "I'
The Court's reasoning in Young can be reduced to two key proposi-
tions: first, that "criminal" prosecutions by private "interested" parties
rather than by the State or a "disinterested" prosecutor are unjust or
unfair per se; and second, that criminal contempt is no different from an
ordinary crime in this respect. Sections III and IV examine these pro-
positions in depth and show them to be based on shaky ground. Before
proceeding, however, it is important to spell out the critical assumptions
underlying each of these propositions.
With respect to the first proposition, the Court claimed to "establish a
categorical rule against the appointment of an interested prosecutor.
46. Id. at 805.
47. In enunciating this principle, the Court relied heavily on ethical rules embodied the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that any private interest or obligation in connection
with a prosecution is inconsistent with a government prosecutor's specific obligation to the public
interest in "justice." See id. at 803 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY EC 7-
13 (1980) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty
is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988) (forbidding federal prosecutors
from representing the government in any matter in which they have even an indirect financial
interest)).
48. Young, 481 U.S. at 805.
49. In Young itself, because the underlying order provided for a large liquidated damage award
upon a violation of the injunction, and because there were several civil actions pending between the
parties (including a defamation action filed against Vuitton's attorney), there existed at a minimum
"opportunities for conflicts to arise, and ... at least the appearance of impropriety." Id. at 806
(emphasis in original). Moreover, the case's resemblance to a "David and Goliath" battle (between
the Vuitton Corporation and small family-run Korean street vendors) could have only fueled the
Court's concern that this prosecution was an abuse of prosecutorial power. Vuitton's counsel has
been criticized elsewhere for his zealous methods of removing name-brand imitators. In a subse-
quent case, the Court severely castigated the same attorney and assessed double costs and damages
against him for his overly aggressive prosecution of a similar trademark action on behalf of another
client. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading Co., 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Young, 481 U.S. at 808.
51. Id. (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 207 (1968)).
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. "52 In fact, although the Court framed the issue as one of "inter-
ested" versus "disinterested" prosecutors, the distinction is more prop-
erly between "private" versus "public" prosecutors. This is apparent
both from the language of the decision itself, from its reliance on Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc. ,"3 and from subsequent decisions construing Young.
Although the Young decision focuses on the "conflict of interest" aris-
ing when the beneficiary of the underlying order is also prosecutor of the
criminal contempt action,54 the Court's reliance on Jerrico 55 demon-
strates that the Court actually eschewed prosecution by private parties
rather than by "interested" ones. In Jerrico, the Employment Standards
Administration (ESA) of the Department of Labor sought an injunction
against an employer for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
same government office then brought civil enforcement action, seeking
penalties for violation of the injunction. The Supreme Court held that
there was no unconstitutional conflict of interest,56 despite the facts that
(1) the same government agency that had brought the underlying action
was prosecuting the contempt; and (2) the statutory program provided
that the agency would be rewarded for the prosecution with repayment
of part of its administrative expenses.57
The Jerrico court, contrary to the Young court's implication, specifi-
cally upheld the prosecution of a penalty action by the "interested" gov-
ernment agency which had brought the underlying action. The Young
Court emphasized Jerrico's passing statement that "[a] scheme injecting
a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial deci-
sion."5" It concluded that government prosecutors may be barred from
52. Id. at 814.
53. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
54. Young, 481 U.S. at 804.
55. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 249-50.
56. The Jerrico Court's finding that the potential conflict of interest raised no due process viola-
tion may have reflected the technically civil nature of the penalty action. However, as the Young
Court looked to Jerrico in constructing its framework for conflict of interest in criminal contempts,
the case is fair game for analysis here.
57. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 247.
58. Id. at 249, cited in Young, 481 U.S. at 807 & n.19. Jerrico relied much more strongly on
the distinction between the greater degree of "impartiality" necessary for judges and the lesser de-
gree required for prosecutors, a principle that the Supreme Court effectively reversed in Young by
holding that prosecutors must be disinterested, but interested judges may initiate prosecutions for
criminal contempt of their own orders. 446 U.S. at 242-50. See supra notes 42-43 and accompany-
ing text.
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prosecuting where they have a personal interest and held that in Young,
because the contempt prosecutor already represented "an interest other
than the government," a conflict existed per se.5 9 In other words, en-
forcement of an order by the same party who obtained the order, even
when the prosecutor has an institutional financial interest in the prosecu-
tion, is permissible as long as the "interested" party is the government. I
In the years since Young, several lower courts have clarified and made
explicit that Young's prohibition on "interested" prosecution of con-
tempts is actually a prohibition only on private "interested" prosecution
of contempt. In FTC v. American National Cellular,6 1 the Ninth Circuit
held that Young did not bar an agency from bringing a criminal con-
tempt action even when the same agency had brought the underlying
civil injunctive action. The court noted that Young focused on the con-
flict between the roles of private and public prosecutors and thus did not
control the case before it, in which the "interested" party was the govern-
ment.62 Several state court decisions have reached the same result.63 As
59. Young, 481 U.S. at 806.
60. For a discussion of the extent to which the government is or is not in fact overly "inter-
ested" when it enforces its own orders, see infra notes 62, 110 and accompanying text.
61. 868 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1989).
62. Id. at 319. The court went on to hold that even a government attorney may have an im-
proper conflict of interest in bringing a criminal enforcement action if his or her "perspective is [too
closely] colored by involvement with the underlying civil action .. " Id. Because the FTC con-
tempt prosecutors were not the same individuals who had brought the underlying civil action, and
because the U.S. Attorneys' office had been consulted and had filed an appearance, the Ninth Circuit
held that the FTC's prosecution "did not compromise the principles of prosecutorial impartiality
and the appearance of propriety." Id. at 320. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit found that prosecu-
tion of criminal contempt by the same SEC attorneys who had brought the underlying civil action
violated Young's prohibition. United States ex tel. SEC v. Carter, 907 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1990).
However, the Ninth Circuit's dicta and the Fifth Circuit's holding may be inconsistent with Young
and Jerico. Young emphasized a "structural" conflict of interest stemming from private prosecu-
tion of contempt, rather than personal subjective overzealousness. Young, 481 U.S. at 806 (noting
an "inherent conflict in roles"). There is surely equal "structural interestedness" in a prosecution
whenever the same agency brings its own enforcement proceeding for an underlying order, whether
the same individuals or other employees prosecute. See Department of Social Servs. v. Montero, 758
P.2d 690, 693 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (in child support enforcement case, facts that the office of the
Corporation Counsel is a governmental agency and that the beneficiary of the court order is the State
Department of Social Services "do not make the deputy corporation counsel who prosecuted this
case any less 'interested' "). Moreover, in Jerrico there were actually extraneous incentives for pros-
ecution, including financial and personal benefits to be derived, and yet the Court found no due
process violation. Rather, the Court noted that "[p]rosecutors need not be entirely 'neutral and
detached." 446 U.S. at 248. Given the extent of Young's reliance on Jerrico, and the Young
Court's repeated emphasis on the conflict between public and private interests in prosecuting, a more
accurate reading of these decisions might well permit a Carter-like prosecution, by the same govern-
ment attorneys who litigated the underlying case, barring specific evidence of a personal interest
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is discussed in Sections III and IV, when the new requirement is defined
in terms of a "public" rather than a "disinterested" prosecutor, it be-
comes easier to see that this "right" protects the public more than de-
fendants, and that it is not appropriate in the contempt context.
64
The second key element of the Young decision was the Court's equa-
tion of procedural rights in the criminal realm with the protections due
in criminal contempt. This proposition also was based on an unarticu-
lated and inaccurate assumption: that criminal contempt, as exemplified
in Young, brings full use of the "expansive prosecutorial powers" of the
criminal justice system to bear against defendants. Throughout the opi-
nion there runs a strong sense of outrage at the image of the powers of a
public prosecutor being wielded by private parties for private gain.
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accu-
sation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ
the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if
a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investiga-
tion and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this
reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this power will
be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of
justice.65
separate from any institutional interest of the government. See Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 197
(6th Cir. 1989) (noting that Supreme Court precedents including Jerrico suggest numerous struc-
tural incentives for aggressive prosecution are permissible). This issue is discussed further, infra
note 110 and accompanying text.
63. Rollins v. State, 748 P.2d 767, 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (when defendant violates court
order in land dispute with municipal government, government may bring criminal contempt action,
because municipality acts out of duty to serve public interest). Cf. Carter v. Broderick, 750 P.2d
843, 845-6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Rollins, in which government is both civil and
criminal prosecutor, from instant case, in which private party seeks enforcement of order). See also
State v. Britt, 377 S.E.2d 79, 82 (N.C. Ct. App.) (in child abuse prosecution, because there was no
underlying judgment whose enforcement would benefit one party, no "conflict" existed in the partic-
ipation of mother's private attorney in criminal prosecution), cert denied, 380 S.E.2d 772 (N.C.
1989). Contra Department of Social Servs. v. Montero, 758 P.2d 690 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988).
64. For purposes of this Article, the term "public" includes private counsel appointed to act on
behalf of the government. As long as counsel stands in the shoes of a government prosecutor, he or
she is for our purposes acting as a "public" prosecutor.
65. Young, 481 U.S. at 814. See also id. at 807 ("A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion
in matters such as ... what methods of investigation should be used [or] whether any individuals
should be granted immunity."); id. at 811 (referring to "expansive prosecutorial powers. . ."); id.
("Prosecutors 'have available a terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information,' such as
'police investigation and interrogation, warrants, informers and agents whose activities are immu-
nized, authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands [and] enhanced subpoena power.... The
misuse of those methods 'would unfairly harass citizens ... '") (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 460 (1986)).
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The facts in Young easily inspire this sense of injustice: a well-financed
corporation obtained the powers of the United States Attorney and used
them to wiretap, prosecute, negotiate plea bargains, and grant immunity
to its much smaller civil adversary, while continuing its civil litigation
against the same adversary." However, the Young opinion is not limited
to these facts, but appears instead to assume that they exemplify criminal
contempt prosecutions in general.67 This assumption is highly inaccu-
rate. The truth is that in most contempt prosecutions in state courts, the
private "prosecutor" does not have available the "terrible array" of coer-
cive powers of the State.68 Rather, these cases are usually litigated as an
extension of the underlying civil action, like any other civil case, pursu-
ant to civil rules of discovery and procedure, and without any special
prosecutorial powers. As described above, in many instances, small con-
tempt actions are brought pursuant to court rules governing particular
areas, such as landlord-tenant, domestic relations, and intrafamily dis-
putes.69 Additionally, contempt actions are often litigated by pro se par-
ties who brought the underlying actions. Such litigants often have little if
any mastery over even civil legal procedures. The reality of pro se litiga-
tion against represented defendants is a far cry from the Supreme Court's
depiction of criminal contempt actions as employing "the full machinery
of the state" against helpless defendants.7"
66. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
67. The Court referred to the Second Circuit's opinion, which explicitly ruled that these extra
powers were authorized under FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b), but did not itself explicitly address that issue.
Young, 481 U.S. at 793 (citing United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils., S.A. v. Klayminc 780 F.2d 179,
184-85 (2d Cir. 1985)). In light of the Second Circuit's ruling, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
was completely unaware that the scope of the powers of a contempt prosecutor was a litigable issue.
68. Even Rule 42(h) and its state counterparts do not specify any particular powers to accom-
pany appointment of a contempt prosecutor. See Klayminc, 780 F.2d at 184 (noting that Rule 42(b)
and caselaw do not prohibit such powers).
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Castellanos v. Castellanos, 117 Daily Wash.
Law Rptr. 1192, 1193-94 (D.C. 1989) (noting that IntraFamily contempt cases are brought pursuant
to IntraFamily Rules, not Rule 42(b), and distinguishing Young on grounds that extraordinary pow-
ers are not available in IntraFamily contempt prosecutions).
70. In pro se cases, the Court's portrayal of a helpless individual up against the "public glare"
and "full machinery of the state" is entirely misplaced. This is especially true in light of the fact that
accused criminal contemnors are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel if they are subject to
more than six months in jail. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1924). In at least some
jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, counsel are routinely appointed for contemnors fac-
ing fewer than six months in jail. A pro se litigant can hardly overpower a represented defendant;
yet Young would nonetheless bar such a "prosecution," since unrepresented petitioners are at least
as interested as counsel.
The problem of the pro se contempt "prosecutor" crystallizes the issue of whether the Court's
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Thus, as discussed in Section IV, the criminal analogy does not prop-
erly apply to contempt cases.71 Rather, the Young requirement of a dis-
interested prosecutor should be limited to cases like Young in which the
criminal analogy holds, Le., in which the private prosecutor acquires the
full powers of a state criminal prosecutor.
III. QUESTIONING THE "RIGHT" To A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Implicit in the Court's emphasis on public versus private prosecutors
is the assumption that public prosecutions are more "neutral" and
thereby more "meritorious" and "just" than prosecutions by interested
private parties, which are concomitantly viewed as unfair, unjust, and an
abuse of prosecutorial power.72 This view is inaccurate as a matter both
of practice and principle.
With respect to practice, the following brief survey of the history of
private prosecution of criminal actions and current state court practices
will demonstrate that the Supreme Court vastly understated the degree
to which private prosecution is a part of our history and the role it con-
tinues to play today in certain types of courts and cases. Secondly, as a
matter of logic or principle, requiring a public prosecutor does not really
protect defendants as do other fundamental due process rights of the ac-
cused. Rather it is more a systemic requirement that protects the public
concern in Young is "interestedness" or "power." As the rest of this Article makes clear, I believe it
is the balance of power, rather than "interestedness," which is critical to fundamental fairness.
71. Some few courts have distinguished Young on this ground. See Sassower v. Sheriff of West-
chester County, 824 F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1987) (Young does not control state-court contempt
proceeding when interested party's counsel merely engaged in "routine New York State practice" by
moving for contempt and notifying the accused of his obligation to appear); State ex rel. O'Brien v.
Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Grimm, J., concurring) (state-court contempt
proceedings are more limited in scope and less involved than type involved in Young); Castellanos,
117 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. at 1194. But cf In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to compare scope of prosecutorial actions as basis for distinguishing Young). However, the
Young decision was not clear in its scope and several courts have taken Young at its word. See supra
notes 16 and 17.
72. Young, 481 U.S. at 803 ("The United States Attorney is the representative.., of a sover-
eignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest... is... that justice shall be done.") (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)); id. at 808 ("personal interest ... may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the
prosecutorial decision.") (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980)); id. at 811
("If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial powers to gather information for private purposes,
'the prosecution function has been seriously abused . . . ."); id. ("what is at stake is the public
perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system"); id, at 814 ("those who wield this power
[must] be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice").
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interest in a public system of criminal justice. This is not the kind of
"fundamental right" that properly translates to the contempt context.
A. Private Prosecution-A Common Law Tradition
The Young Court attempted to portray its holding as consistent with
common practice and precedent. The Court claimed its adoption of a
right to a disinterested criminal contempt prosecutor was "consistent
with [the] trend" of prior caselaw, vs and stated in passing that "[m]ost
states have acknowledged [the] principle" of prohibiting private prosecu-
tion of criminal cases. 74 In fact, however, the Young decision broke that
trend when it adopted a right to disinterested prosecution of contempt;
the Supreme Court had not previously established such a right for crimi-
nal defendants.75 Moreover, contrary to the Court's claim, no such right
has been widely established in the states; in fact, most states did and still
do accept private prosecution in one form or another.
1. Historical Background
Under the common law, both in England (until well into the nine-
teenth century) and the United States (until the end of the eighteenth
century) the private injured party, rather than the State, brought crimi-
nal prosecutions. Originally implemented through trial by "private bat-
73. Id. at 808 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 207 (1967)). See also Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728 n.2 (1988) (Young reaffirmed the Court's reliance "on traditional and
subsisting practice in determining the constitutionally [sic] permissible authority of courts.").
74. Young, 481 U.S. at 808 n.19 (citing Patricia Moran, Private Prosecutors in Criminal Con-
tempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REv.
1141, 1153 n.51 (1986)). Although the note cited by the Court does state that most states prohibit a
private attorney who is involved in related civil litigation from participating in a criminal prosecu-
tion, it does not support the Court's broader claim that private prosecution is generally defunct in
the states.
75. Indeed, several federal courts previously had upheld the constitutionality of private prose-
cution in criminal cases. See Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985) (no due process
violation when private attorneys in civil action conducted criminal prosecution for drunk driving);
Powers v. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1968) (participation of private prosecutor in murder
trial does not violate due process); Krotkiewicz v. United States, 19 F.2d 421, 425 (6th Cir. 1927)
(private interested party's attorney permitted to sit with and advise district attorney in prosecution
of bankrupt company's president). But cf. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967)
(prosecution of husband for assault on wife unconstitutional when wife retained prosecutor for di-
vorce action). In Jones, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Ganger on the grounds that the prosecutor
in Ganger had used his position to seek an advantageous civil settlement, while in Jones the district
attorney retained control of the prosecution and the private attorneys did not use their prosecutorial
position to exact an advantage in their civil litigation. Jones, 776 F.2d at 1246. Ganger is discussed
in greater detail, infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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tie,"7 6 private prosecution evolved in the eighteenth century into the
formal institution and prosecution of criminal charges by private parties,
at their own expense. 7 Private prosecution to enact "private vengeance"
has been called "one of the most characteristic circumstances connected
with English criminal law....
Although the British system of private prosecution may have been
merely the result of "historical happenstance," 79 it nonetheless consti-
tuted a fundamental philosophical underpinning of English criminal
justice:
[No stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due ob-
servance of the law of the land, by all persons under all circumstances, than
is given by the power, conceded to everyone by the English system, of test-
ing the legality of any conduct of which he disapproves, either on private or
on public grounds, by a criminal prosecution.80
Thus, although private prosecution has now been supplemented, and in
many respects replaced, by public prosecutions in the name of the
Crown, 1 the English system retains the concept that the Crown brings
criminal prosecutions on behalf of the injured individual, as much as or
more than they are brought on behalf of the community at large.8 2
In the United States, the colonies initially adopted the English system
of private enforcement of the criminal laws. 3 Prior to the end of the
eighteenth century,
criminal prosecutions were generally carried on by individuals interested in
76. "[lit was not until well into the thirteenth century that barbaric justice began to be brought
under control in England, and public inquiries of witnesses began to replace trial by combat." Sid-
man, supra note 12, at 758 n.29, (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44-47 (2d ed. 1898).
77. Sidman, supra note 12, at 758-59.
78. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245
(1883) cited in Sidman, supra note 12, at 756 n.12.
79. Sidman, supra note 12 at 759 (citing 1 STEPHEN, supra note 78, at 496-97).
80. Id. at 758 (quoting I STEPHEN, supra note 78, at 496).
81. Id at 756.
82. For example, in prosecutions initiated by police officers (a substantial proportion of all
English prosecutions), "the correct analysis is that some individual has instituted proceedings, and
the fact that this individual is a police officer does not alter the nature of the prosecution." Id. at 762
n.57 (citing R.M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 155 (6th Ed. 1972)). See
also Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 209, 225 (1955) [hereinafter Remedy] (private prosecution in England and America has
always reflected in "significant part" a policy of encouraging vindication of "private as well as pub-
lic" rights) (citing 1 STEPHEN, supra note 78, at 496); THEOBALD MATHEW, THE OFFICE AND
DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS 4 n.74 (1950)).
83. Sidman, supra note 12, at 763.
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the punishment of the accused, and not by the public. The private prosecu-
tor employed his own counsel, had the indictment founded and the case laid
before the grand jury, and took charge of the trial before the petit jury... it
is common knowledge that the common-law practice still prevails, to some
extent at least, in inferior courts.84
In contrast to its sister system in England, however, the American sys-
tem developed quickly into one that relied much more broadly on institu-
tionalized local public prosecutors. In the late seventeenth century, state
prosecutors were established in some colonies, and by the end of the
eighteenth century, most states were "firmly committed to the concept of
official public prosecution."8 The reasons for this shift are not entirely
clear, but a widespread belief in the superiority of public "disinterested"
justice has taken deep root.86 Statutes in every state currently establish
the office of a local public prosecutor "whose duty it is to prosecute crim-
inal actions in the name of the state."8
2. Current State Practices
Nonetheless, private prosecution remains far from nonexistent in the
United States. 88 In fact, the majority of states still permit private prose-
84. State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). See also Sidman, supra note 12,
at 768 n.86; John A.J. Ward, Note, Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV.
1171, passim (1972).
85. Sidman, supra note 12, at 763 (citing 4 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVATION
AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 7 (Wickersham Commission 1931)). Sidman notes
that very little has been written on the history of the system of public prosecution in the United
States. Id. at 762 nn.58, 61. However, one recent work documents a thriving system of private
prosecution as late as 1880 in the Philadelphia magistrates' courts. See Gerald Caplan, Criminal
Justice in the Lower Courts: A Study in Continuity, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1694 (1991) (Book Review).
86. See, eg., State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928) ("In an early day in England
private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs which they suffered.... Our scheme of government has
changed all this. It is now deemed the better public policy to provide for the public prosecution of
public wrongs without any interference on the part of private parties ... ").
87. Sidman, supra note 12, at 764. Such statutes typically provide that the district attorney
shall "[p]rosecute or defend all actions, applications, or motions, civil or criminal, in the courts of his
county in which the state or county is interested or a party; . . ." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.47(a)
(1988), cited in Sidman supra note 12, at 764 n.68.
88. Even apart from direct private prosecutions, remnants of a belief in the private interest in
criminal prosecutions persist. For example, the author of Remedy, supra note 82, correctly notes
that some existing American criminal statutes define purely personal crimes. Id. at 225 n.91. Adul-
tery statutes frequently permit only an injured spouse to initate a prosecution. See, eg., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(B) (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.31 (1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.36(2) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09(2) (1985). See also Lee v. State, 231 P. 324, 325
(Okla. Crim. App. 1924) (adultery is a "private wrong" that must be initiated by injured party, but
may be continued by State after divorce); State v. LaBounty, 116 P. 1073, 1073 (Wash. 1911) (adul-
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cution, albeit with restrictions. 89
The most common context in which private prosecutors are found is in
the role of "assistant" to the public prosecutor. Commentators surveying
state law have found that approximately thirty of the state courts consid-
ering the issue have upheld the use of privately employed prosecutors as
assistants to state prosecutors of criminal actions.' Courts defend this
practice as beneficial to the public and individual victims and harmless to
defendants. They argue that private prosecution ensures prosecution by
a party with an interest in competent prosecution, and that defendants
are prosecuted according to the same rules regardless of who employs the
prosecutor. 91
Even those few states that generally outlaw private prosecutors usually
permit private parties' counsel to participate to a certain extent.92 Nota-
tery is crime against spouse, not society, that may be prosecuted only by formal complaint by spouse
to "prohibit intermeddling" by State). In arguing for more private prosecution of criminal offenses,
Remedy has marshalled a number of compelling examples of American law's recognition of the
private interest in criminal prosecutions, including, on the one hand, state statutes giving injured
parties the right to challenge in court a public prosecutor's nolleprosequi decision, and on the other,
the existence of statutes that incorporate the concept of punishment into private litigation, such as
qui tam actions, multiple damages, and punitive damages. Remedy, supra note 82, at 225-27 and
accompanying notes; id. at 222-23 (qui tam and multiple damage suits encourage private "prosecu-
tors" by giving them a percentage of the fines obtained in the prosecution of certain crimes).
89. State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Mo. 1976) (en bane) ("[I]n most jurisdictions pri-
vate prosecutors continue to participate in public prosecutions"); Goldsby v. State, 123 So. 2d 429,
437 (Miss. 1960) (private prosecution "represents a common law practice, and that of a large major-
ity of the states of the Union"), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961); State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956). See Ward, supra note 83, at 1171 ("Despite statutory provisions requiring a
public prosecutorial system and judicial repudiation of the procedure in some jurisdictions private
prosecution remains well entrenched."); Remedy, supra note 82, at 218 ("Despite widespread belief
that criminal actions are conducted exclusively by public officials, private prosecutors in fact play an
extensive role in criminal law enforcement."). For example, in the local "Sessions Court" in Knox-
ville, Tennessee, private parties initiate criminal prosecutions by appearing before a magistrate and
making a complaint. If a warrant issues, the accused is arrested and jailed pending arraignment, at
which point the public prosecutor reviews the case and decides whether to go forward. Conversa-
tions with clinical faculty at University of Tennessee Law School.
90. Sidman, supra note 12, at 765-68; Remedy, supra note 82, at 218 n.50 (collecting cases).
91. See, eg., Ray, 143 N.E.2d at 485 ("Both the public and individual litigants in such courts
are sure to be mutually benefited by the services rendered by private counsel, and, if such counsel is
not guilty of conduct which prevents the litigants from having a fair trial, the defendant would have
no right to complain"); State v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631, 634 (N.D. 1895) ("We are unable to discover in
the statute [establishing the office of public prosecutor] any other policy than that of transferring the
control of criminal prosecutions from private to public hands.").
92. Moran, supra note 74, at 1152 n.46. According to the author, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New York, Nebraska, and Wisconsin "generally do not allow private prosecutors to par-
ticipate in criminal prosecutions." However, "minimal participation" is permitted in some cases in
those jurisdictions. Id.
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bly, while a majority of those states that uphold the participation of pri-
vate prosecutors in criminal prosecutions condition that participation on
the public prosecutor's retention of "control" over the prosecution,93
common practices do not necessarily conform to this rule. Rather, when
a private prosecutor participates in an action, he or she often effectively
becomes the main prosecutor."
Some state courts expressly permit private counsel to conduct criminal
prosecutions on their own, with the permission of the public prosecutor
and the judge.9" In fact, in many jurisdictions, including some of the
ostensibly most restrictive, purely private prosecution is fairly common
for lesser offenses, such as those brought before magistrates, justices of
the peace, and housing court and domestic relations courts.96
93. Id. at 1153 & nn.51, 53 (collecting cases requiring consent and/or control of public prose-
cutor). See Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1983) (public prosecutor's control en-
sures protection of state's interest in seeking justice rather than merely convictions); Kent, 62 N.W.
at 634 (control by public official protects against victimization of innocent people by overzealous
private prosecutors).
94. Remedy, supra note 82, at 220 ("Through his role as assistant prosecutor, the private attor-
ney frequently controls the criminal action"). In response to a questionnaire administered by the
author of Remedy, 16% of responding prosecutors stated that private prosecutors are typically per-
mitted to control the prosecution; 60% stated that private assisting attorneys are not restricted in
their participation. Id. at 220 n.60.
The Young Court and others have distinguished between private prosecutors who merely "assist"
public prosecutors and purely private prosecutions. Young, 481 U.S. at 806 n.17 (private counsel's
"familiarity may be put to use in assisting a disinterested prosecutor... but cannot justify permitting
[private counsel] to be in control.. .. "). However, this distinction is weak. Not only does such
"assistance" frequently entail practical control, but any participation by private interested counsel is
vulnerable to the same conflict-of-interest charges and constitutional infirmities: an "assisting" at-
torney is no less obligated to "two masters" than a primary attorney. Indeed, one of the very com-
mentators the Court relied on, see id. at 812 n.23, attacks private prosecutors who assist public
prosecutors for the same reasons the Court relied on in outlawing control by private prosecutors.
Sidman, supra note 12, at 755, 767-68, 790. Nonetheless, some post-Young courts have adopted the
distinction between "assistance" and "control." See, eg., Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 659-663
(4th Cir. 1988) (Southern Poverty Law Center attorney permitted to act as lead counsel while de-
nominated "assistant" because "no evidence" that the U.S. Attorneys' Office did not control "criti-
cal decisions"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 883
(Ky. 1989) (private counsel permitted to participate when District Attorney "retained control" and
private counsel was precluded from involvement in parallel civil litigation).
95. Hall v. State, 411 So. 2d 831, 838-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Cockrell, 309 P.2d
316, 320 (Mont. 1963); State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
96. Remedy, supra note 82, at 221 & nn.63, 64 ("[I]n at least twenty-eight states, it is a com-
mon practice for private attorneys to prosecute criminal actions in the lesser courts. Since these
courts customarily have jurisdiction over all misdemeanors, private citizens may initiate criminal
actions which result in jail terms up to one year"). See Ray, 143 N.E.2d at 485 ("[I]t is common
knowledge that the common-law practice still prevails, to some extent at least, in inferior courts").
See also Katz v. Comonwealth, 399 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Mass. 1979) ("Private parties to civil litiga-
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In some states, the right of private citizens to participate in the prose-
cution of certain criminal actions is affirmatively guaranteed by statute.
Thus, private parties have a right criminally to prosecute violations of
laws prohibiting "the evils of intemperance" in Alabama97 and the elec-
tion laws in Minnesota and New Jersey.98 They have a right to assist the
county attorney in "any matter" in Kansas and Oregon.99
Most states do place one limit on private prosecution, prohibiting any
involvement in related civil litigation." ° Courts typically do not offer
much explanation for this rule, other than to indicate that a private pros-
ecutor involved in related civil litigation has an irreconcilable conflict of
interest between the role of private attorney seeking private advantage
and that of prosecutor of a crime against the State.101 Many courts have
also reserved the right to exclude a private prosecutor when they deem
the relationship between the prosecutor and the defendant "unfair," or
when the prosecutor is hired by a party other than the victim of the
crime who appears to have an extraneous interest in prosecution of the
case.1"2 In some jurisdictions, however, even attorneys involved in paral-
tion [in Housing Court] have the right 'to press both the civil and criminal aspects of the case.' ");
People ex rel. Allen v. Citadel Management Co., 355 N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1974)
(upholding purely private prosecution of landlord by tenant because offenses were petty, and district
attorney too busy to be present at all such cases); People v. Black, 282 N.Y.S. 197, 201 (Ostego
County Ct. 1935) (minor infractions of game laws do not require "heavy artillery" of Attorney
General or district attorney); People v. Lanni, 168 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Monroe County Ct. 1957) (defend-
ant in traffic violation has no right to choose his prosecutor); People v. Van Sickle, 192 N.E.2d (N.Y.
1963) (private prosecution by victim of assault and battery upheld); People ex rel. Howes v. Grady,
21 N.Y.S. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (when district attorney absent, private counsel may conduct prosecu-
tion alone), aff'd, 39 N.E. 858 (N.Y. 1895); Bartell v. State, 82 N.W. 142 (Wis. 1900). See OR. REV.
STAT. § 131.025 (1989) (prosecuting party in criminal case is State of Oregon "[e]xcept for offenses
based on municipal or county ordinances").
97. ALA. CODE § 28-4-314 (1990).
98. MINN. STAT. §§ 211A.08(2), 211B.16(2) (Supp. 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:34-63 (1989).
See also Sidman, supra note 12, at 767 n.82.
99. KAN. STAT. AN. § 19-717 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.165 (1990). See Remedy, supra
note 82, at 222 n.69; Sidman, supra note 12, at 767 & n.83.
100. Moran, supra note 74, at 1154 n.54 (collecting cases).
101. Most such decisions rely on state statutes or public policy, but some courts have alluded to
the constitutional right to a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Mo. 1976)
(en bane) (public prosecutor "is not an advocate in the ordinary sense of the word.., his primary
duty is not to convict but to see that justice is done.... [He] should have no private interest... [but]
is charged with seeing that the criminal laws of the state are honestly and impartially adminis-
tered.") (quoting Ward, supra note 86, at 1173); Peterson v. Peterson, 153 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn.
1967) (due and orderly process is better assured if the [criminal contempt] prosecution is conducted
by an attorney for the state"); Born v. State, 397 P.2d 924, 942 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 1000 (1965), overruled by Brookins v. State, 602 P.2d 215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
102. Remedy, supra note 82, at 221 n.62 (citing cases barring prosecution by attorneys who
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lel civil litigation have been permitted to prosecute criminal actions."x 3
In sum, while it is fair to say that private interested parties are not free
to prosecute criminal actions in all cases, private prosecution-far from
being an artifact of an ill-considered past practice-is still common, and
subject to "widespread approval,"'" or at least, expressly protected from
elimination by most states. Although this does not preclude the Supreme
Court from outlawing private prosecution of criminal contempt, it con-
tradicts the Young Court's implicit assumption, discussed earlier, that
such a right is already widely established in criminal cases. The preva-
lence of the practice also gives rise to a greater need for clear and explicit
reasoning before it is abandoned. 0 5 The Young decision unfortunately
lacks such reasoning.
B. Public Prosecution Is Not An Essential Elment of Fundamental
Fairness
The Supreme Court, other courts adopting the right to a disinterested
prosecutor in criminal actions, and various commentators have argued
that private prosecution is incompatible with fundamental fairness1" be-
cause it is, primarily, unfair to defendants,107 and, secondarily, unfair to
the public.l10 Neither of these rationales survives careful scrutiny. Un-
like previously established due process rights, the disinterested prosecu-
refused to identify their clients, who represented government officials, or who represented another
previous suspect of the crime). See State v. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 1972) (court has discretion to
appoint private prosecutors); State v. Cockrell, 309 P.2d 216, 320 (Mont. 1957) (private prosecution
permitted as long as trial is "fair and impartial" and there is no "conduct prejudicial to defendant");
Ward, supra note 84, at 1172 ("the practice is not to be interfered with in the absence of a showing of
abuse").
103. See, eg., Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1989) (no due process violation when
prosecuting attorney agreed to represent victim in state court civil action before criminal trial com-
pleted); Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (prosecutor hired by victim
or family who also represents them in civil action does not violate due process); Cockrell, 309 P.2d at
319-20 (attorney for assault victim in civil action may prosecute criminal action).
104. Moran, supra note 74, at 768.
105. "The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a
decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in
determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268
(1984) (pretrial detention of juveniles is not unconstitutional) (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 798 (1952)).
106. Moran, supra note 74, at 1157 n.64.
107. Young, 481 U.S. at 804; State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 48-50 (Mo. 1976) (en banc);
Ward, supra note 83, at 1173; Sidman, supra note 12, at 768-77, 776, 781.
108. Young, 481 U.S. at 804-05; Ward, supra note 84, at 1175; Moran, supra note 74, at 1161.
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tor as defined by Young does not protect defendants from the power of
the State. Nor does it necessarily further the public interest in neutral
justice. Rather, it maintains a public system of criminal justice.
Although valid, this interest is not equivalent to a fundamental right that
should be a requirement of due process. Moreover, as discussed in Sec-
tion IV, any such right does not properly apply to the contempt context.
L Defendants' Interests
Private prosecution is seen as unfair to defendants in two respects.
First, it is argued that the criminal prosecutor has the full "machinery of
the state" at his or her command, and that use of such powers for private
advantage is inherently unfair to defendants." 9 Second, courts and
commentators frequently assert that private prosecutors will not exercise
"prosecutorial discretion" in a fair, neutral, or just manner because pri-
vate parties inevitably seek only "to convict," while a disinterested public
prosecutor, with no particular interest in prosecuting or convicting a par-
ticular defendant, seeks more flexibly to "do justice."' 10
109. Young, 481 U.S. at 814. See supra note 73.
110. See Young, 481 U.S. at 805 ("The Government's interest is in dispassionate assessment of
the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary.... A [private] prosecutor may be
tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal
rewards for the private client"); id. at 808 n.18 (a private prosecutor's "undivided loyalty is pledged
to a party interested only in a conviction") (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, Inc.,
760 F.2d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1985), cene denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987)). See also Ward, supra note 84,
at 1173 ("The prosecutor is an officer of the state who should have no private interest in the prosecu-
tion and who is charged with seeing that the criminal laws of the state are honestly and impartially
administered, unprejudiced by any motives of private gain. It is his duty to show the whole transac-
tion as it was, regardless of whether it tends to establish a defendant's guilt or innocence."); Sidman,
supra note 12, at 781 ("To the extent that the attorney retained by private, interested parties is
permitted to influence this discretionary process, the defendant may be denied the unbiased exercise
of the prosecutor's judgment."); Moran, supra note 74, at 1164 ("a public prosecutor new to the case
may be more likely to offer alternative resolutions of the contempt charges such as civil rather than
criminal contempt or plea bargaining if he believes they are in the interest of justice."); id. at 1164
n.101 (To the extent the criminal prosecution is primarily motivated by the vindictiveness of a civil
client, a disinterested prosecutor would be more likely to apply principles of fairness in his recom-
mendations to the judge."). See also Flege v. State, 142 N.W. 276, 277 (Neb. 1913) (Attorney who
has represented the victim's brother could not-but a public prosecutor must-"enter upon the trial
with the single purpose of impartially seeking to know the truth, protecting the rights of defendant,
and seeing that they were maintained, if need be, at all hazards."); Biemel v. State, 37 N.W, 244,
247-48 (Wis. 1888) (a criminal case is likely to be unfair "if the prosecution is ... desirous of
procuring his conviction").
This vision of the public prosecutor as seeking only to present "the whole transaction as it was,
regardless of whether it tends to establish... guilt," Polo Fashions, Inc., 760 F.2d at 705, is difficult
to square with the reality of criminal prosecutors' work. A prosecutor's professional success usually
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With respect to the first concern, requiring a public prosecutor does
not afford greater protection of individual defendants from the abuse of
state power. Rather, as discussed in Section II, most minor criminal con-
tempt proceedings in state courts until now have been litigated by private
parties without the broad array of prosecutorial powers acquired in
Young. The Young rule would require appointment of a State prosecutor
with full state powers to prosecute such cases. Thus, broad application
of Young to state contempt proceedings would require that defendants,
who otherwise would be litigating against a private party with only the
powers of a civil litigant, will now confront a State or appointed prosecu-
tor commanding full prosecutorial powers. This would work a dramatic
change in the balance of power for most contempt cases in state courts,
ironically creating the exact opposite result of that intended.,"
The second reason private prosecution is considered unfair to defend-
ants is that private prosecutors allegedly have a singleminded (or "vin-
dictive") dedication to prosecuting and convicting the defendant, while
public prosecutors, whose sole obligation is to "do justice," are allegedly
more circumspect, less eager to prosecute, and more flexible in consider-
ing alternative resolutions."1 2 This position is untenable for two reasons:
rests on the number of convictions brought in, not the balanced view of "justice" with which cases
are assessed. Perhaps for this reason, criminal prosecutors are at least as notorious for their zeal to
prosecute and convict as are private attorneys. See Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 196 (6th Cir.
1989) ("Politically ambitious and aggressive prosecutors are by no means uncommon, and the zeal of
the prosecutor who covets higher office or who has a personal political ax to grind may well exceed
the zeal of the prosecutor who has the kind of interest, [having been retained by victim to bring tort
action], we are assuming in the case at bar."); Remedy, supra note 82, at 228 ("experience has
demonstrated that the private prosecutor plays as fairly as his public counterpart"). See also Secret
Touches, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 46 (detailing incident of child abuse by adult friend,
prosecutors' inconsistent and deceptive treatment of father and abused child, and motive to convict
for sake of personal glory without regard to well being of abused child, rehabilitation of offender, or
wishes of victim and family). The Flege image of prosecutors seeking only "truth" is in fact incom-
patible with the basic premise of the American adversarial system: that "truth" is not established by
direct inquiry, but by permitting two opposing parties to advocate their opposing positions to the
best of their abilities. Scroggy, 882 F.2d at 197 ("prosecutors are supposed to be advocates").
111. This absurdity was recognized by the D.C. Superior Court in Castellanos, 117 Daily Wash.
Law Rptr. at 1194 (rejecting application of Young to intrafamily cases in part because the private
litigant does not acquire the full powers of the State under the IntraFamily Rules). See also State ex
rel. O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 407-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Grimm, P.J., concurring)
("circumstances in a federal case like Young are different than those which quite often arise in state
court cases.") However, most other state courts that have rejected application of Young have simply
noted that it was not constitutionally based. See supra note 17. Other courts have felt compelled to
follow Young and to reject their existing procedures for private contempt litigation. See supra note
16.
112. See supra note 72.
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first, it is factually inaccurate; and second, it is belied by the Supreme
Court's acceptance of other institutional incentives for prosecution that
fundamentally compromise the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to
prosecute.' 1 3
The assumption that public prosecutors are objective, neutral, and
flexible-whereas private prosecutors are overzealous, singleminded, and
inflexible-is distorted at best. A public criminal prosecution serves only
one interest: punishment for the crime, without particular consideration
to the victim's needs or wishes."1 4 Injured parties have a wide array of
needs and desires, however, which may or may not include vengeance. I s
Thus, as a number of cases and examples show, private parties are in fact
more likely to seek flexible resolutions of their disputes than are public
prosecutors. Such flexible resolutions may in fact punish the defendant
less while satisfying the private party who seeks to protect his or her
hard-won rights embodied in a violated court order.
This trade-off was at the heart of two cases pre-dating Young. In both
Davenport v. State 16 and Ganger v. Peyton, 117 the prosecutor of an as-
sault against a spouse either had previously represented or was then rep-
resenting the victim in a divorce action. In both cases, the courts held
that such prosecutions lacked fundamental fairness and violated due pro-
cess. 1 8 The Ganger court relied in part on indications that the prosecut-
ing attorney had offered to drop the assault charge if the defendant
would agree to a favorable property settlement in the divorce action. 1 9
Even assuming this "worst case" scenario occurred in either case, how-
113. Young, 481 U.S. at 793-80 (judges may insist on prosecution for criminal contempt of their
own order even after public prosecutor declines). See Scroggy, 882 F.2d at 195-97 (suggesting that
Supreme Court's decisions indicate that various institutional incentives for prosecution do not render
prosecution unconstitutionally biased). See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
114. Whether punishment constitutes retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation, is not at issue
here and does not change the fact that state prosecution is singlemindedly devoted to punishment,
and is certainly not designed to further individual victims' interests. See supra note 110.
115. See Secret Touches, supra note 110. This is particularly true in contempt, as distinct from
ordinary crimes. In contempt, the petitioning party has an ongoing interest in some form of relief
that affirmatively benefits him or her, such as implementation of the violated order, or relief for the
violated right. Sometimes conviction and a jail sentence best serves the private purpose, but often
other forms of remedial relief are more effective. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
116. 278 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
117. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). The defendant in Ganger sought to overturn his state-court
convictions in federal court. Because state law afforded one of the convictions no habeas corpus
relief, the Fourth Circuit agreed to decide the due process issue. Id. at 710-11.
118. Davenport, 278 S.E.2d at 441; Ganger, 379 F.2d at 712.
119. Ganger, 379 F.2d at 711-12.
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ever, the dual role of the prosecutor was at least as likely to help the
defendant as to hurt him, by offering a resolution to the criminal action
other than incarceration or fines. Although negotiation of a civil agree-
ment to resolve a criminal prosecution raises questions for the attorney
under existing ethical rules,120 it surely is in the defendant's interest at
least to have the option of negotiating an alternative to the criminal pros-
ecution.12' Purely public prosecutions do not provide such "flexible"
resolutions.
Private parties' interests in alternative dispositions are not limited to
cases in which there is parallel civil litigation at stake. Again, the facts of
the Ganger and Davenport cases, concerning domestic assault, are sug-
gestive. In many such cases of assault, when the victim knows the perpe-
trator, the victim's overriding priority is to assure her future safety and
to obtain a remedy for damages already done. Although she may seek
jail time for her attacker, she might prefer other alternatives, including a
suspended sentence with counseling, agreement to a restraining order,
and/or restitution for damages. Public prosecutors may or may not seek
such dispositions; however, prosecutors are not trained to inquire into
and seek to effectuate victims' interests in a prosecution. Such alternative
resolutions do not fit the paradigm of criminal prosecution, and victims
who seek them are sometimes said to be "abusing the criminal pro-
120. See Sidman, supra note 12, at 773-80 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILiTY EC 5-14 (1980) (prohibiting representation of two or more clients with potentially conflicting
interests); various state statutes prohibiting prosecutors from participating in parallel civil actions).
Although Sidman views private prosecution as an inherent conflict of interest for the private counsel,
the Supreme Court's exception for private "assistant" prosecutors, see Young, 481 U.S. at 806 n.17,
suggests that a lawyer may represent a private victim and the State at the same time without fatally
violating ethical requirements.
A perhaps more obviously applicable ethical prohibition is the principle that lawyers must not
"seek or threaten to seek criminal charges or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a
civil matter." See, eg., D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8-4(g). This rule, although
consistent with the public interest in ensuring that our criminal justice system represents the public
and not particular individuals, does not purport to maximize defendants' interests. A different set of
ethical rules that would not prohibit the mixing of civil and criminal remedies is conceivable. In-
deed, this rule is absent from the ABA's latest version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
However, such a topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
121. Ganger, 379 F.2d at 711. See Moran, supra note 74, at 1161 n.77 ("Such unfairness [Le.,
dealmaking] is not necessarily disadvantageous to a defendant, who may be quite happy to exchange
information or money for the prospect of a lighter sentence in the criminal action."). The Supreme
Court has also acknowledged that an "interested" prosecutor might choose to drop a prosecution in
exchange for a civil settlement. Young, 481 U.S. at 804. However, the Court makes no effort to
reconcile this recognition with the general thrust of the opinion that "interested" prosecutors harm
defendants' interests.
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cess." 1 22 Moreover, even if some prosecutors' offices use alternatives to
prosecution of domestic violence, such a blanket policy may be no more
in a given victim's interests than a blind policy of aggressive prosecution.
An attorney who represents the victim will, by definition, focus on the
victim's needs, whatever they may be, rather than automatically following
a blanket governmental policy.123
This multi-faceted view of victims' wishes could well be extended to
other types of cases, such as burglary or fraud. It is not clear why the
variety of victims' interests has not been acknowledged in the caselaw
and literature, which pervasively assumes that while public prosecutors
will weigh a wide variety of options, all victims seek only to convict.12 4
The second flaw in the claim that Young protects defendants' opportu-
122. Caplan, supra note 85, at 1706 n.26.
123. See Secret Touches, supra note 110. This discussion is not intended to suggest that a non-
criminal prosecutorial policy is best for domestic violence. Indeed, it is this author's view that crimi-
nal prosecution is in the best interests of most domestic violence victims. The fact that some such
victims are ambivalent about putting their attackers in jail may be a function of many factors, in-
cluding discouragement received from the prosecutors and police, fear of retaliation by the abuser,
financial dependence on the abuser, concern about the impact of incarceration on the parties' chil-
dren, and reluctance to take such harsh action against an intimate. See Beth Elfrey, Compelling a
Reluctant Spouse: A Prosecutorial Device to Stop Domestic Violence (1991) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author). See generally, Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecution of Spouse Abuse: Innovations
in Criminal Justice, RESPONSE (1981, 1983); RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WivES 222
(1979). In fact, studies suggest that the single most important factor affecting victims' follow-
through is the commitment of the prosecutor to prosecution. Lerman, supra, at 20-22; LENORE
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 213-15 (1979). The complexity of intrafamily violence victims'
feelings about prosecuting their attackers does not lessen the criminality or severity of the violence or
the importance of a strong criminal justice response. However, it does exemplify the multiplicity of
victims' interests and the inaccuracy of the assumption that victims seek "only to convict." More-
over, when the "prosecution" is for contempt for violation of a civil order previously awarded to
protect the victim, the victim's interest in controlling the nature and timing of the prosecution is
entitled to greater weight than in a criminal prosecution by the State.
124. See supra note 110. Defenders of Young may also argue that private plaintiffs will prose-
cute more cases than the public prosecutor, and that the overall result is detrimental to defendants,
even if some of those prosecutions may result in alternative dispositions. However, it is questionable
whether there is a due process right to prosecutorial inaction. See Remedy, supra note 82. See also
infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text. Proponents of the economic approach to law also sug-
gest that if the number of prosecutions increases, penalties should be reduced, because certainty of
enforcement has increased. See, eg., Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System,
12 . LEGAL STUD. 284 (1983). However, it must be remembered that private prosecutions of con-
tempt were the norm prior to Young, and that penalties in contempt are limited in most states.
Application of Young will effect a reduction in enforcement, without an increase in penalties,
thereby tilting the system excessivly in favor of contemnors. Finally, if Young is taken at its word,
its purpose was not to limit prosecutions, but to have them brought by the State rather than by a
private party. As demonstrated above, prosecution by the State, rather than by private individuals,
is not necessarily in defendants' interests.
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nities to benefit from prosecutorial restraint lies both in the Young deci-
sion and other Supreme Court opinions. As mentioned in Section II,
before reaching the question whether an interested private party may
prosecute criminal contempt, the Court had to decide whether the trial
court possessed the authority to appoint any private counsel to prosecute
a contempt.125 The petitioners argued that criminal contempts are "con-
ventional crimes, prosecution of which may be initiated only by the Exec-
utive Branch."' 126
The Supreme Court roundly rejected the argument. "The ability to
punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring
that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without
complete dependence on other Branches'. . . . Courts cannot be at the
mercy of another Branch in deciding whether [contempt] proceedings
should be initiated."' 127 The Court further stated that since contempt
prosecutions "are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful
by the general criminal laws... [but rather,] to serve the limited purpose
of vindicating the authority of the court[,]J " 28 courts must retain the au-
thority "to initiate such proceedings when the need arises."'' 29 Most im-
portant, although not necessary to its decision, the Court went further
and held that this power must trump the power of the executive branch
to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 30 Thus the Court held: "a court
ordinarily should first request the appropriate prosecuting authority to
prosecute contempt actions, and should appoint a private prosecutor
only if that request is denied."''
Herein lies the greatest irony of the Young decision. While the second
half of the opinion purports to remain loyal to the lofty goals of protect-
ing defendants from abuses of "official power," the first half of its opinion
actually commits a sweeping retrenchment of that protection.
If "impartiality" is the core reason for a disinterested prosecutor, and
if the beneficiary of an underlying order is considered too "interested" to
control criminal contempt prosecutions, surely the judge issuing the or-
125. Young, 481 U.S. at 793-802.
126. Id. at 797.
127. Id. at 796.
128. Id. at 800.
129. Id. at 801.
130. "If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the Executive Branch to redress direct
affronts to its authority, it would be powerless to protect itself if that Branch declined prosecution."
Id.
131. Id.
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der, whose authority is directly flaunted when his order is violated, is no
less "interested" in the order's enforcement.132 As Justice Scalia argued
in his concurrence, authorizing judges to initiate contempt prosecutions,
in contravention of the prosecutor's discretion not to prosecute, has the
potential for creating "the most tyrannical licentiousness." 133
132. The importance of prosecutorial discretion as a protection against judicial abuse is espe-
cially clear in light of the well-established rule that violation of a court order can be "contempt"
even if the order is subsequently struck down as unlawful or unconstitutional. See, e.g., Norman
Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1976). United States v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d
907 (5th Cir. 1984), presents a classic example of the potential for judicial abuse in this context. In
McKenzie, the district court issued a prior restraint against CBS, Inc., enjoining its broadcasting a
story on the homicide trial of several police officers. Id. at 908. Although the Fifth Circuit twice
refused to affirm the injunction, and although the U.S. Attorney refused to prosecute the contempt
(after a request by the judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana) on grounds that it ran afoul of the
First Amendment, the district court appointed private prosecutors. Id. at 910. When all of the
judges of the Eastern District were disqualified from hearing the case, the action was brought in the
Western District of Louisiana. Id. The "impartial" Western District court dismissed the action on
the ground that the underlying orders were unconstitutional. Id. at 910-17. The private prosecutors
appealed the dismissal. Finally, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal on the ground that the private
prosecutors no longer had authority to prosecute the contempt because the dismissal of the action
constituted the revocation of their appointment. Id. at 911.
Although McKenzie was ultimately resolved in the defendants' favor, only the largest, most
pecunious defendants can afford or stomach such extended and tortuous litigation to avoid convic-
tion for criminal contempt at the behest of an outraged, but constitutionally tainted court. Such
cases cannot be uncommon. For example, similar issues were presented in the trial of Manuel
Noriega with respect to transcripts possessed by Cable News Network. Thus, the best that can be
said for the Supreme Court's holding that courts "must" not be at the mercy of the executive branch
in seeking enforcement of their own orders is that the Court projects onto judges a degree of objectiv-
ity and transcendance not universally found in the fallible human beings who inhabit the bench.
133. Young, 481 U.S. at 820 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)). Justice Scalia argued passionately that the majority's holding elevates the
judiciary over the other branches of government, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
481 U.S. at 816-18. At least two courts of appeal have agreed. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167 (5th Cir.) (a court may not initiate a contempt prosecution if the United States Attorney's Office
declines to prosecute because executive discretion controls), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); In re
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). In
Morrison, the Supreme Court further undercut its professed concern for assuring the neutral exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in initiating prosecutions. There the Court upheld the federal "Special
Prosecutor" statute authorizing courts to appoint special prosecutors to investigate and prosecute
particular government officials. The Supreme Court did not respond to the D.C. Circuit's trenchant
objections to the statute: that such a prosecutor, whose very "raison d'etre" is to prosecute a partic-
ular individual, would have "unique incentives to seek an indictment"; and that such a prosecutor
would be unable to exercise "wise prosecutorial discretion," which is rooted in a knowledge of the
"ongoing process" of law enforcement, including measuring this case "against past cases in relation
to broader considerations of sound deployment of prosecutorial resources ... factors [that] often
counsel against prosecution." 838 F.2d at 509-10.
For more in-depth analysis of the judicial power to initiate contempt prosecutions, see Neal
Devins & Steven J. Mulroy, Judicial Vigilantism: Inherent Judicial Authority to Appoint Contempt
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Indeed, Young's aggrandizement of judicial power at the expense of
prosecutorial discretion ffies directly in the face of the Court's earlier
decisions, decisions on which the Young Court purports to rely. These
decisions illustrate that defendants' rights in contempt prosecutions are
most at risk, not from biased prosecutors, but from biasedjudges. Thus,
in Bloom v. Illinois, the Court adopted a right to jury trial because
"[c]ontemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the
most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament."13 4 A
jury trial was necessary because of "the unwisdom of vesting the judici-
ary with completely untrammeled power to punish contempt, and.., the
need for effective safeguards against that power's abuse." 135 Twelve
years later, in Jerrico, the Court crystallized the distinction between
prosecutors and judges, holding that "the strict requirements of Tumey
and Ward are not applicable to the determinations of the assistant re-
gional administrator, whose functions resemble those of a prosecutor
more closely than those of a judge."' 36 In short, the decision provides
Young as the sole exception to the rule that judges are subject to far
stricter conflict-of-interest restrictions than are prosecutors.
Thus, far from enhancing protection of defendants from overweening
State power, Young tips the scales of power against defendants, by re-
quiring public rather than private prosecutors of contempt, and by au-
thorizing judges to initiate contempts when prosecutors refuse. In both
these respects, the decision strays far from the original intent of the very
cases on which it relies.137
Prosecutors in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 76 Ky. L.J. 861 (1987-88). See
also James A. Cohen, Self-Love and the Judicial Power to Appoint a Special Prosecutor, 16 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 23 (1987). Devins and Mulroy argue that independent prosecutorial discretion is no less
vital in criminal contempt than it is in ordinary crimes. Devins & Mulroy, supra, at 863-68.
Although I agree that Young overextends judicial powers, I do not agree that crimes and criminal
contempt are indistinguishable. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text.
134. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1967).
135. Id. at 202, 207.
136, Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 243, 242-49. The quotation refers to Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1973), in which the Court invalidated
prosecutions from which mayors acting as judges stood to benefit financially. 446 U.S. at 242-43.
137. The dangerous trend toward judicial "tyranny" established by Young can be seen in at least
one post- Young circuit court of appeals decision that a court may proceed with a criminal contempt
prosecution without appointing any prosecutor. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 933-
34 (Ist Cir. 1989) (Assistant U.S. Attorney charged with contempt of court order prohibiting contin-
uation of Grand Jury proceeding). The First Circuit found that the district judge was "impartial" as
opposed to Young in which the private-party prosecutor was "biased." Id. at 934. The court further
noted that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute is "largely illusory" when a de-
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2. Public Interest in "Impartial" Justice
Even if it could be proven that public prosecution is more protective of
defendants' interests than private prosecution, the assumption that jus-
tice and due process are better served by public prosecution is still subject
to dispute. "Justice" is not necessarily commensurate with whatever best
protects defendants' interests. And indeed, because private prosecution
is not uniformly disadvantageous to defendants, the Supreme Court and
commentators attempt to rest the disinterested prosecutor requirement
on more universal principles. Thus, the Young Court noted, private
prosecution also may also be unfair because "a prosecutor may be
tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing
benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against
criminal charges." '138 Similarly, commentators have argued that, "[1like
all other aspects of a criminal prosecution, plea and sentencing recom-
mendations should result from an impartial evaluation of how best to
serve the interests of the public, not those of complaining parties."'
139
Such statements beg the critical question: what makes a criminal pros-
ecution "impartial," "meritorious," or in "the public interest"? Courts
and commentators repeatedly equate public "disinterested" prosecution
with "impartiality," "fairness," and "doing justice," as though the equa-
tion is self evident. Yet although a defendant may benefit when a public
prosecutor declines to prosecute a case despite the victim's desire for
prosecution, such a refusal is not necessarily "fair" or "just" to defend-
ants or the public. For example, it is fairly clear that the Ganger court
viewed the prosecution of a wife beater by a counsel retained by the wife
as improper in part because it circumvented the existing policy of non-
prosecution of spousal assults. 1 ' However, although policies of non-
prosecution were in the past accepted as a neutral exercise of
fendant's conduct is unquestioned and in light of Young's holding that the court may supersede the
prosecutor's exercise of its discretion not to prosecute. Id. at 934. But cf. In re Davidson, 908 F.2d
1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1990) (neither opposing counsel nor judge may act as prosecutor of criminal
contempt).
138. Young, 481 U.S. at 805.
139. Moran, supra note 74, at 1161.
Such unfairness is not necessarily disadvantageous to a defendant, who may be quite happy
to exchange information or money for the prospect of a lighter sentence in the criminal
action. But in a criminal prosecution, the rights of the defendant are only one considera-
tion. The public also has an interest in impartial administration of the criminal laws.
Id. at 1161 n.77 (citing People v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1164, 1173 (Cal. 1977); People v. Zim-
mer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 708, (N.Y. 1980)).
140. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1967).
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prosecutorial discretion, such systematic refusals to treat family violence
as subject to the criminal justice system are based on bias against female
victims and unconstitutional permission for violence against women in
the family. In the past ten years, courts repeatedly have found that poli-
cies of nonarrest in family violence cases violate the rights of victims to
due process and equal protection. 4 '
On the other side of the coin, the bringing of even a criminal prosecu-
tion that gives a civil plaintiff a civil advantage nonetheless may be inde-
pendently warranted. Nor is it self evident that a negotiated outcome
trading a criminal prosecution for private interests is inherently "un-
just.' 4 2 When none of these factors is present, and the sole objection is
that the prosecutor represents the victim, there is even less concrete basis
for considering the prosecution unjust or not in the public interest. 143
The most obvious "objective basis" for determining when a prosecu-
tion is "just" is the nature and sufficiency of the evidence. However,
Young made clear that the mere facts of a case are not dispositive. The
Court rejected "harmless error" analysis, under which prosecution by an
interested prosecutor would be permitted if the evidence were ample
enough to justify prosecution per se. 14 Rather, the plurality claimed in-
stead that the use of an interested prosecutor is so "fundamental[ ]" an
error that it taints the integrity of the criminal proceeding, regardless of
the strength of the evidence against the accused. 45 It is even less obvious
that the mere identification of the prosecutor with the victim, Le., as
their counsel, is inconsistent with the "public interest."
Thus, the courts' and commentators' conclusory discussions offer no
141. See, eg., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988); Thurman v.
City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). See also Jessica L. Goldman, Note,
Arresting Wife Batterem" A Good Beginning to Stopping a Pervasive Problem, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 843
(1991). Other examples of improper failures to prosecute abound. The author of Remedy, supra
note 83, advocates use of private prosecution as a remedy for the "unwarranted" inaction of public
prosecutors because "corruption, political ambition, or insufficiency of funds and personnel" often
cause prosecutions to be dismissed. Id. at 210. The author refers specifically to the findings of a
Congressional Committee (the "Kefauver Committee"), which investigated crimes unprosecuted due
to corruption during the 1950s. Id. at 210 nn.4, 5. To the author's list of improper reasons for non-
prosecution could be added bias against women or minorities, as much as against prosecution of
family violence.
142. But cf. Moran, supra note 74, at 1161 (plea bargains and sentencing recommendations
resulting from civil concessions by the defendant are "inherently unfair" to defendants).
143. Caplan, supra note 85, at 1706 n.26 (noting that under Philadelphia's system of private
prosecution battered women's complaints were taken seriously).
144. Young, 481 U.S. at 809-14.
145. Id.
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objective standards by which the "justness," "appropriateness," or "im-
partiality" of plea bargains or charges are measured, and to which agree-
ments reached through private bargaining can be compared. Without an
explicated theory of criminal justice that articulates criteria or a principle
by which to measure the "justness" of prosecutions, the assumption that
public prosecutions are inherently more fair or just than privately initi-
ated ones is simply unsubstantiated. 146
This argument is not intended to suggest that public prosecution of
crimes is "unjust." It merely suggests that "justice" in this context is
simply a stand-in for decisionmaking on behalf of the public, rather than
private parties. Public prosecution should be seen for what it is: a reflec-
tion of social values or mores that treat individual crimes as crimes
against the State, in which the public has a fundamental interest. There
can be little doubt that a powerful and meaningful criminal justice sys-
tem requires public enforcement rather than private vindication.147 The
system of public prosecution constitutes, within human and institutional
limitations, society's best attempt at implementing a criminal justice sys-
tem according to society's priorities and values; it can be said to approxi-
mate the public interest, however inefficiently defined and implemented.
Society has every right to choose to implement its system of criminal
justice through such a public system. 148 This choice, however, should
not be confused with a greater protection of defendants' rights, or, neces-
sarily, with "justice."
146. For example, "[a] moralist might have some difficulty with the proposition that it was 'un-
just' for a person who behaved as irresponsibly as Mr. Dick did [drunk driving] to be prosecuted on
the most serious charge that could be brought for such conduct." Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192,
195 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, in the absence of other objective criteria, it is certainly arguable that
prosecutions are "justified" whenever victims care enough and possess the capacity to pursue them.
As in civil litigation, not every such case will be justified, but the victim's motivation may be at least
as neutral and objective a basis for approximating "justice" as the system currently in place. Young,
481 U.S. at 809-14.
147. See, eg., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 4-5 (1971) (punishment
through criminal justice system operates as a "teacher of right and wrong... the threat and example
of punishment by a legal system will communicate to the individual that the legal system views the
threatened behavior as wrong, and this information will also affect the moral attitudes of the individ-
ual") (quoted in WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 25 (1986)).
148. The Young opinion repeatedly acknowledges the public-interest dimension of the right to a
disinterested prosecutor in its discussion of harmless error. See Young, 481 U.S. at 811 ("appoint-
ment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the
fairness of the criminal justice system in general"); id. ("what is at stake is the public perception of
the integrity of our criminal justice system"); id. at 813 ("[p]ublic confidence in the disinterested
conduct of that [prosecutorial] official is essential").
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In sum, the "right" adopted in Young is not comparable to other due
process rights of accused criminal contemnors. Rights such as the right
to notice, counsel, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and trial by jury14 9
provide defendants with greater protection from the power of the State,
assuring that proof of guilt is substantial and ensuring that the defendant
will have the opportunity to offer a meaningful defense. Compared with
such rights, a "disinterested prosecutor" does not provide insulation
from the State, but ensures prosecution by the State with its full powers;
it does not minimize or reduce the likelihood of conviction or the harsh-
ness of available penalties, but potentially limits and rigidifies penalty
options. It does not create neutral or merciful prosecution decisions, but
permits the judges themselves to initiate and adjudicate prosecutions. It
is, in other words, unlike all other rights of accused criminal contemnors,
a right not inherently protective of defendants. Rather, it derives funda-
mentally from the public's interest in a publicly enforced criminal justice
system. This interest, no matter how important, is one that should not
be transferred to the contempt context.
IV. LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL ANALOGY
Even if the right to a disinterested prosecutor were established as fun-
damental in the criminal realm, the Supreme Court's second key proposi-
tion-that the same right automatically should apply in the contempt
context-is wrong. The analogy of criminal contempt to ordinary crimes
is necessarily limited, and it falls apart specifically when considering who
prosecutes the action.
Bloom best summarized the rationale for the "criminal analogy":
Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the
law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.... [It is] indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for
their impact on the individual defendant is the same. Indeed, the role of
criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identi-
cal-protection of the institutions of our government and enforcement of
their mandates...
[I]n terms of those considerations which make the right to jury trial funda-
mental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference between serious
contempts and other serious crimes. 150
149. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
150. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1967).
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Of the two rationales for the criminal analogy offered by Bloom-the
impact on the defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding-it is clear
that the first alone is an insufficient basis upon which to equate a con-
tempt proceeding with a criminal prosecution. The impact on the ac-
cused of a civil (or summary) contempt proceeding may include extended
incarceration, and may be every bit as severe as-or more severe than-
the impact of many criminal prosecutions; yet a civil contemnor is af-
forded none of the due process protections to which criminal defendants
are entitled.15' The criminal analogy must therefore rest on the per-
ceived similarity of purpose between criminal contempt proceedings and
criminal prosecutions.' 52 Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that both types of proceedings are similarly brought to uphold the insti-
tutions and laws of our government by punishing those who infringe
them. 153 A contempt prosecution "vindicate[s] the court's authority,"
while a criminal prosecution vindicates the authority of the criminal
laws. 154
The flaw in the analogy is that criminal contempt proceedings also
have inherently civil purposes and aspects. These practical and theoreti-
cal differences between criminal contempt proceedings and criminal
prosecutions highlight the inappropriateness of grafting a public prosecu-
tor requirement onto contempt proceedings.
Although entire bodies of law and procedure rest on the accepted dis-
tinction between criminal and civil contempts, the proper line between
them is actually far from clear. Traditionally, courts have looked to the
purpose of the sanction imposed. A sanction designed to compensate the
opposing party or to coerce his or her compliance with the order is
paradigmatically "civil," while a purely punitive sanction is typically
151. See supra note 13; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, reprinted in
ABRHAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN & JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 61, 64 (1971) (not-
ing that criminal and civil law cannot be distinguished on the basis of severity of sanctions, since,
"with the possible exception of death, exactly the same kinds of unpleasant consequences, objectively
considered, can be and are visited upon unsuccessful defendants in civil proceedings.").
152. The Bloom Court appeared to base its holding primarily upon the impact on the defendant,
and only mentioned the analogous purposes of the proceedings as an afterthought. Bloom, 391 U.S.
at 201. However, other cases have increasingly focused on the supposedly parallel purposes of crimi-
nal contempt proceedings and criminal prosecutions. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,
369 (1966) ("It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that serve to
distinguish criminal from civil contempt") (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 441 (1911)).
153. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201; Young, 481 U.S. at 797.
154. Young, 481 U.S. at 804; see infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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"criminal." 155 However, the simple distinction between coercing compli-
ance and punishing past behavior is difficult to sustain.
In crucial respects, both coercive and punitive purposes are always
present in both civil and criminal contempt. Unlike a criminal prosecu-
tion, in which the violation of law typically has occurred in the past,
contempt of a court order almost always involves an ongoing issue be-
tween the parties. Thus, even a determinate sentence imposed as "pun-
ishment" to "vindicate the court's authority" will inevitably also
"coerce" future compliance with the ongoing injunction, to the future
benefit of the private party.56 For this reason, although "criminal" con-
tempts are technically said to be purely to vindicate the court's authority,
courts often have acknowledged that criminal contempt proceedings also
protect private interests.I57 Conversely, "coercive" sanctions, such as the
two-and-a-half-year jail term Elizabeth Morgan served for violating an
order relating to child visitation, 5 ' are also inherently "punitive."
The confusion between civil and criminal contempt has been wide-
spread.' 59 One of the most trenchant examples arose in Shakman v.
155. "If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complain-
ant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the
court." Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. See Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 827 (5th
Cir. 1976) (if purpose is to compel obedience or to compensate victim, action is civil contempt).
156. Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court A Suryey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 240 (1971) (as
long as an injunction continues to have meaning into the future, there is something "left to coerce").
The very concept that punishment is retrospective while "coercion" is prospective is inconsistent
with the well-respected view of criminal punishment as a means of coercing future obedience to law.
Then-professor Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., after noting that the "general purposes of criminal and
civil liability are the same," said, "[p]revention would accordingly seem to be the chief and only
universal purpose of punishment." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Theories of Punishment and the
External Standard, reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 151, at 27, 31. Dobbs criti-
ques the Gompers decision and others for spawning a number of "deviant" tests for distinguishing
between criminal and civil contempt and argues that the only meaningful criterion is whether the
sentence is determinate or indeterminate. Dobbs, supra, at 240. For a discussion of this criterion,
see infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)).
157. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1988) (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443); In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564, 596 (1895) ("a court, enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt, is
not executing the criminal laws of the land, but only securing to suitors the rights which it has
adjudged them entitled to."). See also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) ("civil
proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely... both punitive and
remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties.").
158, See supra note 13.
159. It is not uncommon to find appellate reversals of contempt trials on the grounds that the
proceeding should have included due process protections, because the contempt is, with hindsight,
found to be "criminal." See, eg., Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Buff-
ington v. Baltimore County, MD., 913 F.2d 113, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1990) (because a fine payable to
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Democratic Organization." In that case the plaintiff class had obtained
an injunction against local government officials prohibiting coercion of
their employees to engage in political activity in support of the adminis-
tration of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. However, the "Daley
machine," famous for its effective marshalling of political patronage,
proved difficult to dismantle. In defending against the plaintiffs' con-
tempt action on appeal, the defendants claimed that, since they were
found to be in contempt for past acts violating a prohibition of the court,
the proceeding must have been criminal, and that they had been deprived
of the appropriate due process protections. In rejecting the defendants'
claim, the court noted that the distinction between civil and criminal
contempts depends on whether the relief sought is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court, or remedial, for the benefit of the complain-
ant.161 In determining into which category this proceeding fell, however,
the court found itself at a loss: the pleadings, which sought a fine and
"conditions to purge the contempt," were no help because, as in most
contempts, "the relief sought may be appropriate for either criminal or
civil contempt." '162 Since it could not base its finding on the pleadings,
the court sought to read the plaintiffs' minds, to determine whether they
had sought "punishment" or "coercion." '163 Although the petition was
based on past acts in violation of the injunction, the court found it rea-
sonable to conclude that the proceeding was intended to "assure future
compliance during the remaining highly critical time before the city elec-
tion." The relief was, thus, "not necessarily to punish the 'past com-
pleted acts,' . . but rather to coerce .... 164
This convoluted analysis demonstrates that, prior to imposition of a
sanction, most contempt actions can be defined equally appropriately as
punitive (criminal) or remedial (civil), because they are, in fact, both. 165
court is criminal, not civil, contempt proceeding lacked requisite due process protections), cert. de.
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1106 (1991); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Broadway Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 94 (2d
Cir. 1983) (setting aside unconditional prison terms because proceedings lacked the due process
protections required in criminal proceeding).
160. 533 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976).
161. Id. at 349.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 349-50.
164. Id. at 350.
165. One court attempted to relieve the confusion by propounding the theory that civil contempt
consists of three stages, the first two of which are coercive and the third of which is punitive. NLRB
v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court defined the three stages: (1)
issuance of an order; (2) issuance of a conditional order threatening a penalty; and (3) issuance of the
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In partial recognition of the inevitable overlap of purposes and attend-
ant confusion in determining whether a contempt proceeding is civil or
criminal, the Supreme Court, in Hicks v. Feiock,166 recently refined the
analysis"6 7 so that the distinction would rest on a single factor. In Hicks,
the Supreme Court held that a state law putting the burden of proving
inability to pay child support on the violator of a support order was un-
constitutional in a criminal contempt proceeding, because it shifted the
burden of proof of a "crime" from the state to the defendant. In its
opinion, the Court attempted to lay to rest the various theories described
above that lower courts had used in distinguishing between civil and
criminal contempt. And it explicitly reduced the analysis to the single
question of whether the sentence could be purged by compliance. 68 The
aphorism most often associated with this doctrine is the phrase that a
proceeding is civil only if the imprisoned individual "carries the keys to
the jail in his own pocket."'169
In explicating its single-factored definition, the Hicks Court went fur-
ther than prior courts, specifically rejecting the view that a suspended
sentence conditioned on fulfilling certain obligations is "civil" because
the contemnor may avoid imposition of the sentence by complying with
the conditions.'70 Because suspended sentences also occur in criminal
prosecutions, the Court found that suspension of a sentence cannot
render a contempt proceeding "civil." Instead, the Court treated the sus-
pension of the sentence as incidental to the imposition of a determinate
penalty. Id. at 1184. Although the third stage no longer offers the contemnor an opportunity to
avoid the penalty, but rather simply imposes the penalty, the Blevins court concluded that this stage
remains a "civil" proceeding, free of criminal due process protections. Id. at 1185-86. See also New
York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d Cir. 1989) (imposition of daily
fines after violation of order containing threatened fines is part of civil contempt proceeding), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). Although this view is not without persuasive effect, the problem
highlights the inherently self-defeating character of the distinction between civil and criminal con-
tempt: at the third stage the proceeding is no longer "coercive" but is purely punitive. Yet if it were
treated as a "criminal" proceeding, a common procedure for imposing civil contempt sanctions
would no longer be available. A similar problem with respect to suspended sentences is discussed in
Dobbs, supra note 137, at 245 ("it may be wrong to attempt a solution based purely on logic here.
There is no ready basis for the selection of one premise over another..
166. 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
167. Although state law usually governs criminal and civil proceedings, when federal constitu-
tional protections are at issue, state law is not dispositive of the question. Id. at 631.
168. d. at 640.
169. Id. at 633 (citing Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947)). See also In re Nevitt, 117
F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1900).
170. Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787, 789 (9th
Cir. 1989); Zapata v. Zapata, 499 A.2d 905, 908-09 (D.C. 1985).
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sentence, and noted that a suspended sentence is in itself a "punishment"
that cannot be wholly purged. 171
The Court's litmus test may be helpful in creating a bright line be-
tween criminal and civil contempt. 172 However, in so expanding the defi-
nition of criminal contempt, the Court has also drifted far from its
original rationale for the criminal analogy.
As discussed earlier, the criminal analogy was based on an alleged par-
allel between the purposes of criminal prosecutions and criminal con-
tempt prosecutions: both seek to send a clear message upholding and
enforcing the authority of the law. But the Hicks "determi-
nate/indeterminate sentence" test vastly broadens the range of contempt
proceedings that fall into the category of "criminal" contempt, sweeping
into the category many sanctions tailored specifically to benefit the pri-
vate opposing party rather than to "punish" a violation of public law.
For example, as three Justices argued in their dissent in Hicks, the sus-
pended sentence in that child support contempt proceeding, conditioned
on payment of arrearages and future obligations, was clearly designed
primarily to coerce payment of the money owed for the benefit of the
petitioner. 173 This is far from the paradigm of a proceeding to vindicate
171. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 639 n.11.
172. It may not even succeed at this, however. For example, the Court did not resolve whether
imposition of a penalty after initial imposition of a conditional sentence is treated as a "criminal" or
"civil" proceeding. See supra note 169. Although the decision states that a fine payable to the court
is "punitive" and therefore a "criminal" sanction, it suggests that suspension of such a fine would
render the sentence "remedial" and "civil." 485 U.S. at 632. This holding is of course inconsistent
with other parts of the decision, which established that the mere suspension of a sentence of incarcer-
ation does not render the sanction "civil." Id. at 639 n.ll. In fact, the principle that suspended
sentences are "criminal" contempts has not been fully followed in the lower courts. See, e.g., Brown
v. Filson, 117 Dally Wash. Law Rptr. 1901, 1902 (1989) (continuing earlier order suspending sen-
tence in ostensibly civil contempt proceeding in child custody and visitation dispute).
Notably, although Hicks tried to replace the ephemeral "purpose" test with its single-factored
determinate/indeterminate test, the next year the Supreme Court, in United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989), revived a variation of the purpose test. In Halper, the Court held that, for purposes
of double jeopardy, a civil sanction constitutes "punishment" when it "cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose. . ." Id. at 448.
Both past tests and the Hicks test are vulnerable to the criticism that they "put the cart before the
horse," Le, that they require the sentence to be issued before it can be determined whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal. Harmer, supra note 2, at 248.
173.
The sanction imposed on respondent is unlike ordinary criminal probation because it is
collateral to a civil proceeding initiated by a private party, and respondent's sentence is
suspended on the condition that he comply with a court order entered for the benefit of
that party. This distinguishes respondent's sentence from suspended criminal sentences
imposed outside the contempt context.
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the authority of the court or the law.174 By the same token, it is hard to
see why-if this sentence is "criminal" despite the remedial sanction and
the focus on the opposing party's interests-the indefinite incarceration
of the contemnor, if he refuses to comply with the same conditions,
should be called "civil. 175
The Court's attempt to create a bright line separating criminal from
civil contempts thus only highlights the difficulty of sustaining the dis-
tinction. At this point, it should be recalled that courts' reliance on the
criminal analogy traditionally has been constrained by the recognition
that contempt is "sui generis."' 17 6 For example, it has long been recog-
nized that contempt proceedings need not proceed by indictment or in-
formation, 177 and that juveniles may be tried for contempt in nonjuvenile
courts. 178  But the difference between contempt and a criminal case goes
Hicks, 485 U.S. at 650 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Suspended sentences are especially common in the contempt context, precisely because there is an
ongoing relationship between the parties and a need for specific future compliance with the existing
order. In contrast, in criminal cases, suspended sentences do not typically reflect an ongoing rela-
tionship between the defendant and the victim, or affirmative obligations that must be met. Rather
they serve as a warning and incentive to a defendant not to commit another crime (as well as an
acknowledgment, in many cases, that time already has been served pending trial).
174. Cf. id. at 638 (stating that purpose of proceeding was "wholly ambiguous").
175. Because sanctions in civil contempts can be so severe, numerous commentators have called
for the application of full due process protections to civil contempt proceedings. See, eg., Goldfarb,
supra note 2, at 175; Harmer, supra note 2, at 255-56. In this author's view, this should be accom-
plished by eliminating the distinction between criminal and civil contempt whenever jail is contem-
plated, with the possible exception of summary proceedings for in-court contempts. However,
treating all contempts as "criminal" for purposes of due process need not mean that all due process
protections of criminal defendants, such as the right to a disinterested prosecutor, attach to accused
contemnors. Rather, as argued in Section III, supra, the rights granted contemnors should be those
that actually protect accused individuals from an unbalanced or unfair contest. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the applicability of constitutional procedural constraints to "quasi-criminal" or
nominally civil proceedings, see Mary Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinc-
tion, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991). On the specific question of whether civil contemnors are enti-
tled to the same due process protections as criminal contemnors, Professor Cheh appears to endorse
the Supreme Court's distinction, that incarceration when one is "capable" of compliance does not
require the same protections as incarceration after the fact. Id. at 1368.
176. Jencks v. Goforth, 261 P.2d 655, 661 (N.M. 1953). See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) ("Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal");
Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1987) (criminal contempts
have "unique status as quasi-criminal sanctions") (quoting United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d 334,
343 (5th Cir. 1982)); United States v. Nunn, 622 F.2d 802, 803 (5th Cir. 1980) (contempt proceed-
ings have "special constitutional status").
177. Dobbs, supra note 156, at 235. See also United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1101-02
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
178. Dobbs, supra note 156, at 235 n.216.
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deeper than these holdings. If one thinks in terms of what makes the
criminal law "criminal," rather than "civil," it is apparent that contempt
is fundamentally different in principle and function from a crime. 179
One of the most thoughtful explorations of the essence of the criminal
law appears in an essay on "The Aims of the Criminal Law," by the legal
and philosophical scholar Henry Hart.180 In attempting to arrive at this
essence, Hart first dismissed numerous characteristics that might be
thought to define criminal law, such as the following: (1) Criminal law
constitutes a set of prohibitions or affirmative requirements; (2) these
commands are made on behalf of the community as a whole to the com-
munity as a whole; (3) violation of these commands subjects the violator
to sanctions; (4) criminal law embodies injuries to society that society is
generally interested in preventing; (5) criminal proceedings are brought
by public officials; and (6) criminal sanctions are harsher than civil sanc-
tions. 81 Hart points out that none of these characteristics in fact distin-
guishes criminal law from civil law. For example, torts and contracts
law also constitute a set of commands that bind all members of the com-
munity, violations of which subject the violator to penalties. Moreover,
society has a profound interest in upholding the law of torts and con-
tracts, both civil and criminal actions are brought by government offi-
cials, and civil sanctions can be every bit as "harsh as many criminal
sanctions. 182
What then, distinguishes a criminal sanction from a civil sanction? In
Hart's view it is "the judgment of community condemnation which ac-
companies and justifies its imposition."1 13 "[T]he criminal law ... de-
179. Devins & Mulroy, supra note 133, challenge the principle that contempt is sui generis,
arguing that this notion derived from an erroneous unreported judicial decision transported from
common-law England. Id. at 870-71. They also claim that "contempts are violations of the general
criminal law," because a federal statute explicitly makes violations of judicial decrees punishable by
fines or imprisonment. Id. at 874 (emphasis in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)). However,
this argument misses the boat: § 401 merely codifies the common-law contempt power. It does not
make contempt a crime; contempt is still set apart from other criminal acts explicitly designated
"crimes." Moreover, the argument does not account for the inherent difference in the nature and
function of contempt and ordinary crimes discussed above.
180. Hart, supra note 151. Hart was Professor of Law at Harvard University, was co-author
with Herbert Wechsler of The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953), and is considered a
father of the "legal process" school of legal thought. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed.
1958).
181. HART & SACKS, supra note 180, at 63-64.
182. Id. at 64.
183. Id. at 65.
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fines the minimum conditions of man's responsibility to his fellows and
holds him to that responsibility."1 4 A "crime" is "not simply anything
which a legislature chooses to call a 'crime' ... ." Rather, it is "conduct
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community."' 18 5
Held up to this definition of what makes a proceeding essentially crim-
inal, it is apparent that contempt proceedings are, at root, different.
While a criminal proceeding is brought on behalf of the entire commu-
nity to enforce fundamental community mores, a contempt proceeding is
brought to enforce an order obtained through private litigation for the
benefit of an individual private party. While a criminal prosecution up-
holds laws that society has determined are essential to a civilized society,
a contempt proceeding enforces an order that never would have become
"law" but for the individual efforts of private citizens on behalf of their
own particular interests. 8 6 Apart from a generalized social interest in
"vindication of courts' authority," society has no particular stake in en-
forcement of private orders. And society's practical interest in such vin-
dication does not compare to the "moral condemnation" or "minimum
conditions of man's responsibility to his fellows" embodied by the crimi-
nal law.'8 7  Rather, the "public interest" in vindication of judicial au-
thority through contempt is more akin to the public interest in
enforcement of the civil law: both are a means to an end of ensuring that
social, economic, political, and legal interactions are conducted accord-
ing to certain understood rules. Important though both the enforcement
184. Id. at 70.
185. Id. at 65. In other words, crimes are those acts that society would view as morally heinous
even if they were not illegal: eg., contract violations are typically considered wrong because they
are illegal, and not necessarily because they are inherently immoral. See James Fitzjames Stephen,
Of Crimes in General and of Punishments, reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 151,
at 17 ("The substantive criminal law... relates to actions which, if there were no criminal law at all,
would be judged of by the public at large much as they are judged of at present."). After reviewing
various criteria for distinguishing "criminal" and "civil" proceedings, Professor Cheh arrives at a
similar conclusion. Cheh, supra note 175, at 1359-60 (arguing that adjudication of criminal guilt
entails "a public restatement of social boundaries and a public reinforcement of the concept of indi-
vidual responsibility.").
186. See supra note 173.
187. "The People are not concerned in contempt actions in the sense that such actions are in
violation of the peace and dignity of society." People v. Goss, 141 N.E.2d 385, 391 (Ill. 1957). See
also State ex rel. O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting disinter-
ested contempt prosecutor in dicta, while acknowledging adoption by Missouri Supreme Court of
such a right in criminal cases).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
128 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the civil law and respect for judicial authority are, neither equates to
criminal law in inherent moral force or significance.
In light of this difference between contempt and criminal actions, it is
not surprising that criminal prosecutions traditionally 18 have been pros-
ecuted by the State, while contempt proceedings are typically initiated
and prosecuted by the injured private party. The reasons for this are
clear: in contempt, the private party has obtained a particular order ben-
efiting that party. Once the order has been violated, the private party
seeks enforcement to protect his or her own specified legal interests. In-
deed, only the private party is aware of .his or her order's violation and
can bring it to the court's attention. The Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments notwithstanding, even when "punitive" determinate sentences are
sought in contempt, such a sanction is inevitably still a means of enforc-
ing an ongoing orderfor the benefit of the party to the order. In contrast,
criminal behavior is not adjudicated until the police recognize it as crimi-
nal and the prosecutors bring it to court as a matter of State interest.
The fact that private parties traditionally and naturally prosecute con-
tempt proceedings is the fundamental difference between criminal and
contempt proceedings. This difference is not incidental, but is an essential
aspect of contempt; and it is precisely this private enforcement role that
makes any contempt difficult to categorize as purely criminal. 18 9
Thus, the Young Court's ruling barring private parties from prosecut-
ing criminal contempts, by eliminating the right to bring a criminal con-
tempt action privately, would make contempt proceedings fit the
criminal analogy by fiat. But because contempt proceedings fundamen-
tally are matters of private interest in a way that criminal prosecutions
are not, forcing the former into the pigeonhole of the latter is neither
appropriate nor justified.
188. But cf. supra notes91-108 and accompanying text.
189. Historically some courts and commentators have judged contempt actions to be "civil" if
litigated by private parties and "criminal" if brought by the State. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445-48 (1911) (reversing jail sentence because private parties' bringing of
proceeding and award of costs to complainant indicate a civil proceeding); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Broadway Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1983) (when evidence was presented by
attorney for party securing order and there was no "designation" of the proceeding as "criminal"
contempt, the proceeding was civil); OWEN M. FIss, INJUNcTIONs 833 0972) (civil contempt pro-
ceeding is tried by the parties as part of the main case; criminal contempt is between the government
and the defendant only). However, the "identity of the prosecutor" test has been criticized as a
"deviant" means of distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt. Dobbs, supra note 137, at
239. This test should not survive the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks. 485 U.S. at 638 (participa-
tion of District Attorney not by itself dispositive of whether proceeding is criminal).
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V. CONCLUSION
To the extent private litigants bring contempt actions to enforce their
own orders, such actions should not be forced into the ill-fitting mold of
a governmental criminal action by extending Young to create a due pro-
cess requirement of a disinterested prosecutor. However, when a court
appoints and grants the private party powers of a governmental prosecu-
tor, such as investigative powers, wiretap authority, the authority to plea
bargain and to grant immunity-as was the case in Young-the party
has obtained powers available only to the government, and the balance of
power has shifted markedly against the defendant. In such cases, the
appointed counsel has taken on the role of a prosecutor for the govern-
ment. Then, because of the fundamental unfairness of giving a private
party governmental powers to be brought to bear against an opposing
party, only a "disinterested" attorney should be appointed to represent
the State.
Such a rule would fairly reflect the legitimate concerns of the Young
Court about abuse of the "full machinery of the State."' 190 This rule also
would protect the rights of private parties to bring motions to enforce
their private orders in the majority of state court cases, in which con-
tempts are prosecuted without additional specially granted powers. 191
Adoption of such a rule should not require creation of a due process
ight because it depends on the authority granted to the prosecutor by
the court in particular cases. Rather, the determination of when a "dis-
interested" prosecutor of contempt is required should be made by the
states' highest courts under their supervisory authority, based on their
understanding of their state's procedures in particular types of cases. 192
It is fitting for state courts to shape their own policies on this matter,
because the realities of state civil litigation, a far cry from the relatively
glamorous case before the Supreme Court in Young, must inform any
meaningful resolution of this issue.
190. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
191. The Castellanos court distinguished Young as a case in which "a civil plaintiff was author-
ized by the trial judge to utilize extraordinary means to facilitate the prosecution of a civil defendant
for criminal contempt.. ." Castellanos v. Castellanos, 117 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 1192, 1194 (D.C.
1989).
192. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1989) (Leibson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state supreme court should exercise its supervisory authority to adopt disinterested
prosecutor requirement); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (noting that this issue would have to be resolved by state supreme court).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/4
